AND 
1 i\li VjrJulxIYlAlN Jjfk 

ANDRE CHERADAME 




Hamburg 




'FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF 
THE NET IS SPREAD." 

PRESIDENT WILSON'S FLAG DAY ADDRESS, JUNE 15, 1917. 




Glass. 
Book- 



BY ANDRE CHERADAME 



THE PANGERMAN PLOT UNMASKED. 
Berlin's Formidable Peace-Trap of " The 
Drawn War." Introduction by the late 
Earl of Cromer, O.M. Illustrated with 
maps net $1.25 

" It is by all means the most pregnant volume on the 
deeper issues of the war that has come under our eyes. 
The author has his material reduced to its lowest di- 
mensions, and he has it at his finger-tips. It is a book 
that every one should read and think about." 

— Boston Transcript. 



THE UNITED STATES AND 
PANGERMANIA 



THE UNITED STATES AND 
PANGERMANIA 



BY 

ANDRE CHERADAME 

AUTHOB OP "the PANQEKMAN PLOT UNMASKED' 



' From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread." 

— President Wilson's Flag-Day Address. 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 

1918 



35-15- 



Copyright, 1918, bt 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



Published January, 1918 




TO MY AMERICAN READERS. 

For twenty-two years before the frightful 
struggle let loose upon the world by Prussian- 
ized Germany, I spent all my time and all 
that I could command of resources and intelli- 
gence in studying the Pangerman conspiracy 
by means of systematic investigations which 
took me into one hundred and seventy-seven 
cities of Europe, America, and Asia. It was 
my hope that by exposing the German plans 
I might give a timely enough warning of the 
approaching danger to make it possible that 
fitting action could avert war. 

I did not succeed in gaining a hearing from 
those whom it was necessary to convince in 
Europe; but the long continuance and persis- 
tence of my efforts, evidenced by the works I 
published before 1914, prove conclusively that 
I am a man of peace, for I have done every- 
thing in my power to prevent war. Con- 
tinuing my task in the same spirit, it is my 
wish at least to contribute toward the ending 
of this appalling conflict on such conditions that 
it can never be renewed. A decisive victory 



vi UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

of the Allies which will make any aggressive 
return of Pangermanism impossible is the only- 
way by which this end can be attained. Toward 
gaining this victory, by rejecting from the be- 
ginning the crafty manoeuvres of the Berlin 
Government unceasingly renewed to divide 
and deceive the Allies, the deliberate and pro- 
found conviction of every citizen of the United 
States can accomplish much I have, there- 
fore, brought together in this little book, writ- 
ten for you especially, a series of specific facts, 
easily verified, which should establish among 
you this certain conclusion: 

Germany no longer exists. In her 
place stands Pangermany, whose ex- 
istence is incompatible with the inde- 
pendence of the United States and 
the freedom of the world. 

September 10, 1917. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PAGE 



Preface — To My American Readers - - - v 

CHAPTER I. 

Pangermanism and William II. - - _ . 1 

I. The Pangerman doctrine. 
II. The Kaiser, originator of the Pangerman plan. 

CHAPTER II. 

The Pangerman Plan .--___ 10 
I. Its extension from 1895 to 1911. 
II. The plan of 1911 regarding Europe and Turkey. 

III. Its extension to Asia, Africa, America, and 

Oceania. 

IV. General view of the German plan of world-wide 

domination. 
V. The stages toward its fulfilment. 

CHAPTER m. 

The Immediate Causes of the War - _ . 31 

I. Why the Treaty of Bucharest suddenly became a 

formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan. 
II. How political conditions in Austria-Hungary in- 
clined Germany to bring on the war. 

CHAPTER IV. 

Pangerman Y is Made - - - - - - -41 

I. The extent of the realization at the beginning of 

1917 of the Pangerman plan of 1911. 
II. Economic Pangermany. 
III. Military Pangermany. 



viii UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 
CHAPTER V. 

FAOE 

Pacifist Manceuvees to Keep the Hamburg-Peesian 
Gulf Scheme for Germany as a Minimum Result 
OF THE War - - - - - - - - 59 

I. Strategic and economic conceptions of the Ger- 
man General Staff upon which all pacifist ma- 
noeuvres are based. 
II. Separate peace to be made by Berlin with one of 

the Entente. The trick of Alsace-Lorraine. 
HI. Separate peace to be made with the Entente by 

Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary. 
IV. The democratization of Germany. 
V. Peace by the "Internationale" or Socialist party. 
VI. The trick of an armistice. 

VII. The "Drawn Game," or "Peace without annexa- 
tions or indemnities." 
VIII. What is Germany's word worth? 



CHAPTER VI. 

The "Drawn Game"; the Insidious Snare of the 
Formula, "Peace without Annexations or Indem- 
nities" ---------86 

I. How the hypothesis is brought forward. 
II. Cost of the war much greater to the Allies than 
to the Germans. 

III. The struggle has allowed Germany to obtain 

enormous advantages in the present and for 
the future. 

IV. The war has brought the Allies only losses. 

V. Consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan 
in regard to Russia and Asia. 
VI. The blatant falsehood of the formula, "Peace 
without annexations or indemnities." 
Vn. The formidable danger of the Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf plan to the Allies. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS ix 

CHAPTER VII. 

PAGE 

How TO Destroy Pangermany - - - - - 122 
I. Why Austria-Hungary is the crucial point of the 
universal problem presented by the Hamburg- 
Persian Gulf plan. 
n. The thesis of the preservation of Austria-Hungary. 

III. The application of the principle of nationalities 

to Central Europe. 

IV. A strong barrier of anti-Pangerman nations can be 

established in Central Europe, and there only. 



CHAPTER Vm. 

The United States and the Pangerman Plot - - 139 
I. The moral principles of the American people 

make it their duty to take part in the war. 
n. The political interests of the United States oblige 
them to contribute toward a decisive victory 
for the Allies. 
HI. The United States and the Austro-Himgarian 
question. 



CONCLUSIONS. 

I. Germany's responsibility for bringing on the war 
is inexcusable and crushing, since its premedi- 
tation by the Prussian Government antedates 
the outbreak of hostilities by at least twenty- 
one years _._-___ 150 
rr. The Allies should constantly bear in mind not 
only the German occupations of Entente terri- 
tory, but also the Pangerman seizures which 
have been made at the expense of their own 
allies -_.-_--_ 159 



X UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

PAGE 

III. The Allies should so conduct the war that Pan- 
germany shall not only be destroyed, but re- 
placed by territorial conditions which will pre- 
vent its recurrence, and which conform to the 
principles which the Allies have proclaimed - 162 



MAPS AND FACSIMILES. 



FAOE 



The Poles in the east of Germany _ - _ _ l 

The Danes in Prussia ------- Q 

Germans and non-Germans in Austria-Hungary - - 3 

The Pangerman plan of 1911 12 

World-consequences of the Hamburg-to-the-Persian Gulf 

project as forecast by the plan of 1911 - - - 15 

Colonial Pangermanism and South America - - - 19 

The anti-German barrier in the Balkans after the Treaty 

of Bucharest August 10, 1913 _ . . - 33 

The nationalities in Austria-Hungary _ - - - 35 

The three barriers of anti-Germanic peoples in the Bal- 
kans and ia Austria-Hungary - - - - 38 

Pangermany at the beginning of 1917 - - - - 43 

The German fortress at the beginning of 1917 - - 63 

Results of the move known as the "Drawn Game" - 91 

The results in Asia of the realization of the Hamburg-to- 
the-Persian Gulf plan --.--_ 109 

The knot of the European problem - - - - 123 

Map of the Martyrs 141 



xii MAPS AND FACSIMILES 

^ PAGE 

Distribution and percentage of Germans born in Germany, 
now residing in the United States, in proportion to 
the population born in United States (1890) - - 143 

Title-page of Kannenberg's book on Asia Minor - - 152 

Facsimile of photograph from Kannenberg's book 

facing page 154 

"From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread" - 158 

Territory occupied by Pangermany at the opening of 1917 160 

The Europe of the Peace ------ 165 



THE UNITED STATES AND 
PANGERMANIA 



CHAPTER I. 

PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM H. 

I. The Pangerman doctrine. 
II. The Kaiser, originator of the Pangerman plan. 

I. 

Pangermanism is a doctrine of purely Prus- 
sian origin, which aims at annexing, irrespec- 




^ , o 

^*\Breslau 



OPragueV- A .^' - \ 

A u grx R I A \ 



THE POLES IN THE EAST OF GERMANY 



tive of race or language, all the various regions 
of which the possession is deemed useful to 
the power of the Hohenzollerns. 

1 



2 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 



It was in the name of Pangermanism, a 
theory of usefulness based on sheer cupidity 
and arbitrary will, that Germany formerly 




THE DANES IN PRUSSIA 



took, and means to keep, the eastern prov- 
inces which should by right belong to the 
Slavs, since they still contain a population of 
about four million Poles. 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM 11. 3 

It was in the name of Pangermanism that 
in 1864 Prussia seized that part of Schleswig 
which was entirely Danish. 

It is still in the name of Pangermanism that 




I 1 Germans 
b%%3 Non Germans 

100 aoo 300 Km 



GERMANS AND NONGERMANS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 



Austria-Hungary has long been coveted by 
Germany, although their own figures show that 
Germans are in a very small minority there, 
having only 12 million against 38 million of 
non-Germans. 

As far back as 1844 the future Marshal von 
Moltke wrote: "We hope that Austria will 
uphold the rights and protect the future of 



4 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

the Danubian countries, and that Germany 
will finally succeed in keeping open the mouths 
of her great rivers."* Inspired by this doc- 
trine of rapine, the author of a pamphlet which 
was published in 1895, just twenty-two years 
ago, under the authority of the Alldeutscher 
Verband, a powerful Pangerman society which 
did its utmost to bring on the present war, 
after indicating the vast programme of future 
annexations, found it a natural conclusion that 
no doubt the newly constituted German Em- 
pire will not be peopled by Germans alone, 
but "they alone will govern; they alone will 
exercise political rights; they alone will serve 
in the army and navy; they alone will have 
the right to hold land; and they will thus be 
made to feel that they are a people of rulers, 
as they were in the Middle Ages. They will, 
however, allow inferior tasks to be carried 
out by the foreign subjects under their domina- 
tion." f 

Pangermanism means the absolute nega- 
tion of the principle of nationalities, which was 
the noblest idea given to the world by the 
French Revolution. It may be summed up 

*Von Moltke, Schriften, vol. II, p. 313. 

t Gross Deutschland und Mitteleuropa urn das Jahr 1950, published 
by Thormann & Goetsch, Berlin, 1895, p. 48. 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM II. 5 

as a system of international burglary, and of 
slavery imposed by Prussianized Germans 
upon other races. 

II. 

From this Pangerman doctrine sprang the 
military and political Pangerman plan, of 
which the originator and promoter is the 
Kaiser. Shortly after his accession in 1888 
he made a speech which showed distinctly his 
Pangerman tendencies, and in his answer to 
a speech made by the burgomaster of Mayence, 
on August 28th, 1898, he said that he intended 
to keep inviolate the inheritance bequeathed 
to him by his "immortal grandfather," add- 
ing, "but this I can only do if our authority 
is firmly upheld in regard to our neighbors, 
and to this end there must he united co-opera- 
tion from all of German blood.''' On the 28th 
of October, 1900, at a reunion of officers, he 
declared, ''My highest aim is to remove what- 
ever separates our great German race/' and a 
month before, at Stettin, he said: "I have no 
fear of the future. I am convinced that my 
plan will succeed.'* In the Kaiser's mind this 
plan was summed up in the chief formula of 
the Pangerman doctrine, From Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf; and to accomplish this object 



6 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

he was resolved to bind Austria-Hungary and 
Germany together by increasingly closer ties. 
In order to make sure of his supremacy over 
the Balkan peoples he counted on the co-op- 
eration of such of their Kings as were of Ger- 
manic origin, as in Bulgaria and Roumania, or 
who would feel strongly the Germanic influ- 
ences which he could bring to bear. Thus, in 
1889, he married his sister Sophia to the heir 
of the throne of Greece, later King Constan- 
tine, whose Germanophile role it has been 
easy to follow. 

The Kaiser had scarcely come to the throne 
before he conceived the scheme of flattering 
the Turks and Mohammedans, in order that 
he might seize the Ottoman Empire later, and 
make use of Moslems throughout the world 
as a menace to other Powers. 

On November 8th, 1898, at Damascus, 
William II. pronounced the famous words of 
which the significance is fully apparent now 
that we have seen the German policy devel- 
oped in Russia, in Turkey, in Persia, and in 
China, and have witnessed its efforts to stir 
up agitation among the Moslem populations: 
"May His Majesty the Sultan, as well as the 
300 millions of Moslems who venerate him as 
their Khalifa, rest assured that the German 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM IL 7 

Emperor is their friend forever." In conse- 
quence of this adulation of the Red Sultan, 
Abdul Hamid, the Kaiser obtained, on the 
27th of November, 1899, the first concession 
of the Bagdad railway, which, now that it is 
nearly finished, is an instrument of the Ger- 
man military offensive against Russia and 
England. The German naval and military 
leagues, which count their members by millions 
throughout the Empire, have always been en- 
couraged by the Kaiser, and in return they 
have backed up his incessant demands for a 
larger army and navy. He also encouraged 
the formation of the AUdeutscher Verband, 
or Pangerman Union. This association has 
many important and influential persons among 
its members, and upon it rests an overwhelm- 
ing responsibility for the outbreak of the pres- 
ent war. Since its foundation in 1894 it has 
organized thousands of lectures, and scattered 
millions of pamphlets spreading the Panger- 
man doctrine, with its lust of aggrandize- 
ment, among the German people. It was also 
through the AUdeutscher Verband that, with 
a view to the present conflagration, all Ger- 
mans living outside the Empire were system- 
atically organized; this was especially the case 
in Austria and in the United States. 



8 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

As for the time of the outbreak of war, it 
was the Kaiser who determined it. After the 
Treaty of Bucharest, August 10th, 1913, the 
situation in the Balkan States and the pohti- 
cal conditions in Austria, for reasons which I 
shall show in my third chapter, made him 
decide that the time had come to strike. 
From November, 1913, he was busy preparing 
for early hostilities; he knew that the widen- 
ing of the Kiel Canal would be finished by 
July, 1914, and made his arrangements to fit 
that date. He dazzled the Archduke Francis 
Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria- 
Hungary, by visions of the great advantages 
which action in common would give to the 
Central Powers; he made the archduke a 
visit at Miramar, near Trieste, in April, 1914, 
and followed it up by another in June, at the 
castle of Konopischt. This time he had for 
his companion Von Tirpitz, since so conspicu- 
ous as the chief of German submarine piracy, 
and it was then that the main outlines of the 
combined action of the German and Austrian 
forces, by land and sea, were drafted. 

The assassination of the archduke on the 
28th of June made no difference to the Kaiser's 
plans; on the contrary, this murder was an 
excellent excuse for intervention against Serbia; 



PANGERMANISM AND WILLIAM 11. 9 

it precipitated events. War was declared on 
the 1st of August, just a few days after the 
completion of the Kiel Canal. 

The criminal action of the Kaiser in foster- 
ing the Pangerman plan for twenty-five years, 
was thus revealed to the world. Moreover — 
and let there be no mistake about this — 
thanks to the Pangerman propaganda carried 
on by his express orders, when he came out 
for war he was supported in his decision not 
only by the leaders of German opinion, but by 
a very large majority of the German people. 

Maximilian Harden explicitly acknowledged 
this when he wrote in the Zukunft of Novem- 
ber, 1914:* "This war has not been forced on 
us by surprise; we desired it, and were right 
to do so. Germany goes into it because of 
her immutable conviction that what she has 
accomplished gives her the right to wider 
outlets for her activities and more room in 
the world." 

* Le Temps, November 20th, 1914. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE PANGERMAN PLAN. 

I. Its extension from 1895 to 1911. 

n. The plan of 1911 regarding Europe and Turkey. 

III. Its extension to Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania. 

IV. General view of the German plan of world-wide 

domination. 
V. The stages toward its fulfilment. 

I. 

The Pangerman plan was fundamentally 
established in 1895, but after that date events 
happened in the world which induced the 
Pangermanists to extend it further. Chief 
among these were: the tension between France 
and England because of Fashoda, in 1898; the 
defeat of Russia by the Japanese, in 1905; 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
Austria with the approval of Berlin, in 1900; 
the agreement at Potsdam by which the Czar 
of Russia abandoned all opposition to the 
completion of the Bagdad railway, in 1910; 
and finally the Franco-German treaty of No- 
vember 4th, 1911, by which France ceded 
275,000 square kilometres of the Congo to the 
Germans, while allowing them to hold heavy 

10 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 11 

economic mortgages on Moroccan territory. 
All these were interpreted by the Pangerman- 
ists as signs that Russia, France, and England 
desired peace so much that they would keep 
it on any terms; and the Pangermanists con- 
cluded that their most ambitious hopes might 
soon be fulfilled. Thus the basic plan of 1895, 
revamped and considerably increased, became 
the plan of 1911. 

II. 

This plan of 1911 provided, in Europe and 
western Asia, for: 

1. The establishment, under German rule, 
of a vast Confederation of Central Europe, 
comprising in the west Holland, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, Switzerland, and the northern 
departments of France to the northeast of a 
line drawn from the south of Belfort to the 
mouth of the Somme; to the east Russian 
Poland, the Baltic provinces of Esthonia, 
Livonia, and Courland, and the three Russian 
governments of Kovno, Vilna, and Grodno; 
to the southeast, Austria-Hungary. These 
three groups form a total of 1,182,113 square 
kilometres, with 94,323,000 inhabitants. In 
this Confederation the territory actually be- 



12 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 




longing to the German Empire only com- 
prised 540,858 kilometres, with about 68 mil- 
lion inhabitants, and out of a total of 162 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 13 

million inhabitants only 77 million were Ger- 
mans, the other 85 million being of other 
nationalities. 

2. The absolute submission of all the Bal- 
kan States (containing 499,275 square kilo- 
metres, and 22 millions of non-Germans) to the 
Central European Confederation, thus making 
them mere satellites of Berlin. 

3. The political and military seizure of 
Turkey, which was to be compelled afterward 
to add to its dominions by the annexation of 
Egypt and Persia, the object being to put 
Turkey, with her 1,792,000 square kilometres, 
and her 20 millions of non-German inhabitants 
(to say nothing of those in Egypt and Persia), 
under a strict German protectorate. 

This Germanic Confederation of Central 
Europe was to form a huge Zollverein or Cus- 
toms Union. Treaties of commerce of a spe- 
cial character imposed on the Balkan States 
and on subjugated Turkey would have pro- 
vided Great Germany with an economic out- 
let, and reserved those vast regions for her 
exclusively. 

The Pangerman plan of 1911 may be summed 
up in four formulas: Berlin — Calais; Berlin — 
Riga; Hamburg — Salonika; Hamburg — ^Persian 
Gulf. The union of the three groupings — 



14 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Central Europe, the Balkan States, and Turkey 
— would have made Berlin the predominating 
influence over 4,015,146 square kilometres of 
territory, inhabited by 204 millions of men, 
of whom 127 million were to be ruled, directly 
or indirectly, by only 77 millions of Germans. 

III. 

It was intended that the Pangerman plan 
of 1911 should be made still more effective by 
important seizures of territory in all the other 
parts of the world. These forcible annexa- 
tions shown on the map (p. 15) were set forth 
in Otto Tannenberg's work. Greater Germany, 
the Work of the 20th Century, published at 
Leipsic. The exceptional importance of this 
book cannot be disputed since it bears the date 
of 1911 and contains the exact programme of 
seizures to be effected in Europe and Turkey, 
just as they have already been carried out by 
the German General Staff. The territorial 
acquisitions in Asia, Africa, America, and 
Oceania, which Tannenberg proclaims would 
be the logical sequence of the Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf scheme, would most certainly be realized 
if the Allies should abandon the struggle be- 
fore their victory was decisive. 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 



15 




16 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Supposing them to do so, it is certain that 
after a treacherous peace the Allied peoples, 
exhausted morally and physically, facing the 
formidable armies of Pangermany, would be 
unable to oppose the colonial expansion of 
Great Germany (to which the Hamburg- 
Persian Gulf plan would inevitably lead) be- 
cause they had already given way on an issue 
even more vital to them — that of the inde- 
pendence of Europe. 

It must be added that this programme, of 
which the details are given below, was laid 
down by Tannenberg on the supposition, 
counted on by the Berlin Government^ that Eng- 
land would not go into the war. In order to 
make sure of her neutrality, Tannenberg ad- 
vocated dividing the colonies of the other 
European Powers between London and Ber- 
lin. Now, however, that England is fully in 
the struggle it is certain that in case of defeat 
the colonies Tannenberg assigned her would 
be taken from her, since she would be power- 
less to resist. 

A summary of Tannenberg's predictions 
follows, and it is well to remember that the 
world-wide acquisitions which he assigned to 
Germany in 1911 are less than she will be able 
to attain if she succeeds in establishing her 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 17 

scheme of domination from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf; if she does that, no organized 
force on earth will be able to curb the boundless 
ambition of Berlin. 

In regard to western Asia, Tannenberg ex- 
plains that Asiia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, 
Palestine, western Persia, and the greater 
part of Arabia would be put under the protec- 
torate of the German Empire — that disposes 
of 3,200,000 square kilometres, with 16,500,- 
000 inhabitants. Once masters of the shores 
of the Adriatic, of the ^Egean, of the Darda- 
nelles, and of Aden (and here they would be 
helped by their Panislamic propaganda), the 
seizure of Egypt, and therefore of the Suez 
Canal, would be inevitable. Germany, if she 
commanded these essential strategic points, 
would obviously be able to retake her colonies 
in Africa and Oceania: Togo, Kameroon, 
southwest Africa, eastern Africa, Kaiser Wil- 
helm Land, Bismarck Archipelago, the Caro- 
line Islands, Marshall Islands, the Marianes 
and Samoa, making a total of 2,952,000 square 
kilometres, with 11,787,000 inhabitants. If 
the Allies should give way in Europe they 
could not prevent Great Germany from snatch- 
ing — still according to Tannenberg's pro- 
gramme — the Belgian, Portuguese, and Dutch 



18 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

colonies, namely, the Belgian Congo, Portu- 
guese Angola, and the Dutch East Indies, with 
their 5,680,000 square kilometres and 57,306,- 
000 inhabitants. Next would come the turn 
of the French colonies, the cession of which to 
Great Germany is foreseen by Tannenberg. 
These are Morocco, the French Congo, Mada- 
gascar, Mayotta and the Comores Islands, 
Reunion, Obok and its dependencies in east 
Africa, Indo-China, and the French islands of 
Oceania, making a total of 3,391,000 square 
kilometres, with 33,588,000 inhabitants. Tan- 
nenberg also informs us that the aim of Ger- 
man politics in China was the establishment 
of a zone of solely German influence on the 
whole lower course of the Yang-tse-Kiang and 
the Hoang-ho; that is to say, over that vast 
portion of China which forms the hinterland 
of Kiao-chau, with its total of about 750,000 
square kilometres and 50 millions of inhabi- 
tants. He finally gives an exact enumeration 
of the various German protectorates which 
would be established in the southern part of 
South America, which is largely settled by 
Germans. A glance at the map will show 
these protectorates, as planned in 1911. 

"Germany," says Tannenberg, "will take 
under her protection the republics of Argen- 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 



19 



tina, Chili, Uruguay and Paraguay, the south- 
ern third of Bohvia, so far as it belongs to the 
basin of the Rio de la Plata, and also that part 



■'^^^ 




COLONIAL PANGERMANISM 
AND SOUTH AMERICA 



of southern Brazil in which German culture 
prevails." That is to say, about 6,347,000 
square kilometres, with 18,197,000 inhabitants. 



20 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

"German South America," he concludes, "will 
provide for us, in the temperate zone, a colonial 
region where our emigrants will be able to 
settle as farmers. Chili and Argentina will 
preserve their language and their autonomy, 
but we shall require that German be taught in 
the schools as a second language. Southern 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are countries 
of German culture, and there German will be 
the national tongue." 

As in every other country, the preparations 
for carrying out the Pangerman plan in South 
America were conducted by the organizers of 
the movement most methodically. 

In 1895, when Germany had decided what 
she wanted, she proceeded to make a list of all 
Germans on the face of the globe, in order to 
pick out from among them those who were 
most likely to prove useful tools for carrying 
out the Pangerman plan. The result of this 
registration of the German element throughout 
the world may be found in the Pangerman 
Atlas of Paul Langhans, published by Justus 
Perthes, at Gotha, in 1909. 

These are the figures relative to South 
America: In Peru, in 1890, there were two 
thousand Germans; in Paraguay, in the same 
year, three thousand; in Colombia also three 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN £1 

thousand, and in Brazil four hundred thousand. 
In 1894 there were five thousand in Vene- 
zuela; in 1895 there were fifteen thousand in 
Chili and sixty thousand in Argentina; and in 
1897 there were five thousand in Uruguay. 

The Pangerman societies have carried on a 
vigorous propaganda among all these Ger- 
mans, especially since 1900, and in Argentina 
and Brazil, which were intended to be the 
principal German protectorates, they were or- 
ganized with particular care. The German 
law of July 22d, 1913, known as Delbriick's, 
which deals with nationality under the Empire 
and under the State, has greatly favored Ger- 
man organization in America, and it is impor- 
tant to know at least the gist of it, since it is 
full of significance, and marks the last stage of 
Pangerman organization prior to the war. 

The second part of its article 25 runs as 
follows: "If any person before acquiring na- 
tionality in a foreign State shall have received 
the written permission of a competent au- 
thority of his native State to retain his nation- 
ality of that State, he shall not lose his nation- 
ality of the said native State. The German 
consul shall be consulted before this permis- 
sion is granted." 

From these words we can measure the depth 



22 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

of German astuteness. According to this pro- 
vision, a German may become a citizen of a 
foreign State, but if he obtains a written per- 
mission "from a competent authority of his 
native State," he still continues to enjoy, for 
himself and his descendants, all the rights of 
a German citizen, and may claim the protec- 
tion of the German Empire. 

As this provision is contrary to all general 
principles of international law concerning na- 
tionality, a German citizen who takes advan- 
tage of it is careful not to inform the foreign 
State whose nationality he has acquired of the 
highly pecuUar situation in which he stands. 
Thus Germany was able to have, in every 
State, agents devoted to her aggressive policy, 
while these States were unaware of the danger 
to which this secret service exposed them. 
Apparently they had only to do with fellow 
citizens whom they had no right to suspect. 
It was only after many months of war, when 
their criminal actions compelled them to take 
off their disguise, that the power of these Ger- 
mans masquerading under other nationalities 
appeared in all its formidable importance. In 
South America the German effort at coloniza- 
tion has for a long time been concentrated 
upon three Bazilian States: Parana, which has 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 23 

sixty thousand Germans, Santa Catarina, 
where there are one hundred and seventy 
thousand, and Rio Grande do Sul, with two 
hundred and twenty thousand. In these rich 
provinces they preserve the language, the tra- 
ditions, and the prejudices of the Fatherland, 
and are almost absolute masters. Only forty- 
seven thousand of them are_ still openly citizens 
of the German Empire; about four hundred 
thousand are apparently Brazilian citizens, but 
in virtue of the Delbrlick law a large number 
have remained or become once more liegemen 
of the Kaiser. It may be noted that the 
budget of the German Empire included a sum 
of 500,000 marks for the establishment and 
maintenance of German schools in Brazil, and 
in 1912 Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of 
William II., landed at the port of Itajahy in 
the course of his cruise, to visit his fellow 
countrymen in Santa Catarina. Since the 
outbreak of the war the German game in Brazil 
has gradually been revealed; numerous rifle 
clubs were, in fact, societies for military drill, 
and dangerous enough to ^necessitate their 
disarmament. 

Outside the three provinces mentioned above 
Germans are not numerous in Brazil, but they 
fill most of the principal posts in business 



M UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

houses and banks. In the first period of the 
war these men, having estabHshed Germano- 
phile newspapers pubhshed in Portuguese, 
were able to prevent Brazil from getting ac- 
curate information as to the origin aijd devel- 
opment of the conflict. 

To sum up, the result of the Pangerman 
programme for countries outside of Europe 
would assure to Germany, under the form of 
colonies, protectorates, or zones of special in- 
fluence, in Asia, 4,753,000 square kilometres, 
with a population of 83,490,000; in Africa, 
8,906,000 kilometres, with a population of 
46,850,000; in Oceania, 2,314,000 kilometres, 
with a population of 38,840,000, and in America 
6,347,000, with a population of 18,197,000, 
making a total of 22,320,000 kilometres, hav- 
ing a population of 187,378,000. 

IV. 

If to these figures we add the 4,015,000 kil- 
ometres, with 204 million inhabitants which 
the Pangerman plan of 1911 intended to cover 
in Europe and Turkey, we find that the Ger- 
man project of universal dominion looks for a 
total, in round numbers, of 26 million square 
kilometres, with 390 million inhabitants. 

These figures include at the utmost only 90 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 25 

millions of Germans, properly speaking, who 
would thus exercise supremacy over 257 mil- 
lion belonging to other races. It must be 
clearly understood that the enormous posses- 
sions of Pangermany in both hemispheres 
would be strictly controlled from Berlin. A 
glance at the map on p. 15 will show that all 
the essential strategic points which command 
the seas of the world are included; besides the 
Adriatic, the ^gean and the Dardanelles, the 
Straits of Gibraltar from the side of Morocco 
would be controlled, the Strait of Malacca, also 
Cape Horn, Madagascar, and the naval bases 
of Oceania. 

William II. was well aware that such a 
project could only become an enduring reality 
through the disappearance of all other great 
Powers. When he had finally decided on the 
Pangerman plan he was deliberately resolved 
on the destruction of five of these Powers. 
This essential truth must be kept firmly in 
our minds if we wish to understand the pres- 
ent war. Austria-Hungary was to disappear 
through absorption, disguised at its entry into 
the German Zollverein. A fierce aggressive 
war was to annihilate the military forces of 
France and Russia. To cripple England later 
would be an easy job with France and Russia 



26 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

dismembered and impotent. As for Italy, it 
was intended that she should be a vassal 
State, and she was not considered capable of 
offering even a slight resistance to Pangerman 
ambition. It must be added that the plan of 
1911 did not include war with England. When 
the Kaiser forced it on France and Russia in 
1914 he did not believe that Great Britain 
would come in, or at least not immediately. 

The initial German plan was upset by Eng- 
lish intervention following on the respite gained 
by the splendid resistance of armed Belgium. 
But Germans are stubborn and crafty; by 
adapting themselves to new conditions thrust 
upon them, they have almost succeeded in 
carrying out, even now, their plan of 1911. 

To sum up, the complete Pangerman plan 
aims at procuring for Germany all the means 
of domination by land and sea which would 
enable her to hold the entire world in the 
crushing grip of Prussian militarism brought 
to the highest point of efficiency. Not for a 
moment do the Pangermans pause to reflect 
on the criminality of this programme of uni- 
versal slavery. "War," says Tannenberg with 
his monstrous cynicism, "must leave nothing 
to the vanquished but their eyes to weep with. 
Modesty on our part would be only madness." 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 27 

It Is a fundamental truth, of which I wish 
to convince my readers, that the Pangerman 
plan is solely and entirely based on the achieve- 
ment of the scheme "from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf," which forms its backbone. If 
this is broken it falls to the ground, and the 
projects for German domination are frustrated 
forever. The principal problem which the 
Allies must solve, if they would insure their 
liberty and that of the whole world, is that of 
making the plan of "from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf" impossible. 

V. 

In order to establish the responsibility of 
Germany we need only show clearly the ma- 
chinery for the realization of the Pangerman 
plan as it appears in the light of facts. For 
twenty-two years, from 1892 until war broke 
out, the Pangerman movement has developed 
with ever-growing intensity; a multitude of 
publications, giving full details of the Pan- 
german plan, have been scattered among the 
German people in order to excite in them the 
greed of conquest, and prepare them for the 
fight by the bait of plunder. 

Two of these publications are particularly 
important: the pamphlet published under the 



28 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

authority of the Pangerman Union, Gross- 
deutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950 
{Great Germany and Central Europe in 1950), 
pubHshed by Thormann & Goetsch, S. W. 
Beesel Strasse, 17, Berhn, 1895, which gives 
the Pangermanist plan of that year; and the 
book by Otto Richard Tannenberg: Gross- 
Deutschland, die Arbeit des 20 Jahrhunderts 
{Great Germany, the Work of the ^Oth Cen- 
tury), which was issued by Bruno Volger at 
Leipsic in 1911, and which gives nearly all the 
information to be desired with regard to that 
year's plan. 

The great importance of this Pangerman 
literature is incontestable, and the reality, the 
extent, and the successive stages of the Pan- 
german plan of 1911 are shown: 

1. By the course which Germany has fol- 
lowed in her political and military operations 
since August 1st, 1914. Many have supposed 
that her object has been to obtain pledges of 
security, but it has really been to seize territory 
for annexation almost exactly in the manner 
set forth in Tannenberg's book in explaining 
the plan of 1911. 

2. By the memorial presented on May 
20th, 1915, to the German Chancellor by the 
League of Agriculturists, the League of Ger- 



THE PANGERMAN PLAN 29 

man Peasants, the Provisional Union of Ger- 
man Peasants' Christian Associations (now 
called the Westphalian Peasants' Association), 
the Central German Manufacturers' Union, 
the League of Manufacturers, and the Middle- 
Class Union of the Empire. The importance 
of this document cannot be overrated, for it 
was issued by the most powerful associations 
of the Empire, in which were included all the 
influential elements of the German nation, 
especially the agrarians and the ill-omened 
Prussian squires. Now, the object of that 
memorial was to demand all the annexations 
mentioned in the Pangerman plan of 1911 
which had been made possible by the progress 
of military operations. 

3. By the declarations made at the sitting 
of the Reichstag on the 11th of December, 
1915. The Imperial Chancellor, Von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, said: *'If our enemies do not 
submit now, they will be obliged to do so later. 
. . . When our enemies shall offer us proposals 
of peace compatible with the dignity and 
security of Germany we shall be ready to dis- 
cuss them. . . . But our enemies must under- 
stand that the more unrelentingly they wage 
war, the higher will be the guarantees which 
we shall necessarily exact." One of the depu- 



30 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

ties, Spahn, then explained the drift of the 
Chancellor's speech with still greater precision: 
"We await," he said, "the hour which will 
allow of peace negotiations framed to safe- 
guard permanently, and by every means, in- 
cluding necessary territorial annexations, all 
the military, economic, and social interests of 
Germany through its whole extent." 



CHAPTER III. 

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 

I. Why the Treaty of Bucharest suddenly became a 

formidable obstacle to the Pangerman plan. 
II. How political conditions in Austria-Hungary inclined 
Germany to bring on the war. 

Although the Pangerman plan is unques- 
tionably the underlying and principal cause of 
the war, yet when William II. brought it on, 
in August, 1914, he did so for immediate and 
secondary reasons, a knowledge of which is nec- 
essary to a clear understanding of events. 

I. 

Up to 1911, when Tannenberg published the 
programme of annexations, all the important 
happenings had furthered the Kaiser's aims; 
but after 1912 very serious and quite unlooked- 
for obstacles arose to thwart them. 

Chief among these was the new condition 
of affairs resulting from the Treaty of Bucha- 
rest, which was signed August 10th, 1913, 
ending the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. This 
treaty created in the Balkan Peninsula two 

31 



32 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

groups of States sharply opposed to each other. 
To the first belonged the beaten and sullen 
participants, Bulgaria and Turkey; the second 
was composed of those peoples who had profited 
by the fight, and were satisfied with the re- 
sult, namely Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Greece. These latter, because of their 
recent acquisitions, made at the expense of 
Turkey and against the will of Germany, to 
whom Turkey was already bound, leaned more 
and more toward the Triple Entente, while the 
conquered States, Turkey and Bulgaria, tended 
to uphold Germanism. Before the Balkan 
Wars the influence of the Entente was much 
less in the peninsula than that of Germany, 
but after the Treaty of Bucharest the tables 
were turned, and the Entente found support 
in that group of States which was most power- 
fully organized, and which, as the map shows, 
presented a solid barrier to the Pangerman 
plan in the East. 

If peace had lasted a few more years the 
situation would have been consolidated, and 
this barrier would have been still more im- 
passable; therefore Berlin determined to in- 
tervene. Serbia was unquestionably the pivot 
on which the new Balkan equilibrium turned; 
it was decided to destroy her without delay. 



IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 33 




Berlin <, "^ r" 



O 
Warsaw 




THE ANTI-GERMAN BARRIER IN THE BALKANS 

AFTER THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST 

August 10, 1913 



34 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

and at the same time set iSre to Europe, in 
order, by one swift stroke, to realize the plan 
of 1911. The Treaty of Bucharest was signed 
on August 10th, 1913. On November 6th of 
the same year the Kaiser told King Albert of 
Belgium, during a visit at Potsdam, that in 
his opinion war with France was near and un- 
avoidable.* 

II. 

Not only were the consequences of the Treaty 
of Bucharest disastrous to Pangerman ambi- 
tions in the Balkan Peninsula; to the bound- 
less fury of the government at Berlin they ac- 
celerated considerably the internal political evo- 
lution of Austria-Hungary, which of itself had 
already threatened to counteract all the Ger- 
man plans. 

There are nine different nationalities in the 
Hapsburg Monarchy; these are divided among 
four races: Germanic, Slavonic, Latin, and 
Magyar — this last a peculiar race, of Asiatic 
origin. There are about 12 million Germans, 
four million Latins (made up of Italians and 
Roumanians), 24 million Slavs, and 10 mil- 
lion Magyars. Since 1867 the Germans and 
Magyars have agreed to exercise and main- 

*L'Allemagne avant la Guerre, by Baron Beyens, p. 24. 



IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 35 




tain supremacy for their own profit over the 
Slavs and Latins, although these latter (28 
million) outnumber them, and have fought 



36 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

hard for the last thirty years to obtain poHtical 
rights in the Monarchy proportionate to the 
majority they possess of Hving human beings, 
taxable and conscriptable at will. These ef- 
forts have disquieted William II. and his 
Pangermanists in the highest degree. This is 
readily understood, for if the political power 
in the Hapsburg Monarchy were vested, as 
justice demands, in the Slavs and Latins, who 
detest Prussianism, that in itself would be the 
ruin of the Kaiser's plan for the economic 
absorption of Austria-Hungary, and without 
this absorption he cannot carry out his inad- 
missible plans of exclusive influence in the Bal- 
kans and in the East. His game has therefore 
been, especially since 1890, to say to Francis 
Joseph and the Magyars: "Above all, do not 
concede the claims of your Slav and Latin 
subjects. Keep up absolutely the Germano- 
Magyar supremacy. I will uphold you in the 
struggle with all my power." For a long time 
these tactics were successful, but a few years 
before the war they were on the point of 
breaking down. 

The culture of the Slavs and Latins grew 
steadily, despite the cynical and ingenious ob- 
stacles put in their way by the Germans and 
Magyars; their national organization became 



IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 37 

closer, and they had also the advantage of 
being more prolific than their political rivals. 
These reasons made it increasingly difficult 
for Francis Joseph and his henchmen at 
Bucharest to resist their enlarged demands. 

The Balkan victories of the Slavs in 1912, 
and the success of Roumania in 1913, roused 
the Latin and Slav subjects of the Hapsburgs 
to the greatest enthusiasm, as in them they 
saw the triumph of the principle of nationality 
— their own cause. They persisted more than 
ever in demanding their rights from Vienna 
and Budapest, and the Germano-Magyars 
persisted in refusing them, although with 
waning energy. If peace had been main- 
tained, the cumulative effect of the Bucharest 
Treaty would have made these claims irresisti- 
ble, while Roumania, exulting over her annexa- 
tion in 1913 of the Bulgarian Dobrudja, began 
to look upon Transylvania as a fruit ripe for 
the plucking at Hungary's expense, at a mo- 
ment when all political signs pointed to an 
approaching radical transformation in the 
Hapsburg Monarchy. If all this had taken 
place the influence of Germanism would have 
been jeopardized in the Hapsburg Empire 
quite as much as in the Balkans. 

Under the growing pressure of her Slav and 



38 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Latin elements, the partition, or at any rate 
the evolution toward federation, of Austria- 
Hungary would have become a necessity. 




Berlin , V f--'"'" 

'V-a^ j^ U S S I A 



THE THREE BARRIERS OF ANTI- GERMANIC PEOPLES 
IN THE BALKANS AND IN. AUSTRIA HUNGARY 



This federalism would not have affected the 
frontiers of the Hapsburg dominions, but it 
would surely have given political preponder- 



IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WAR 39 

ance to the more numerous and more prolific 
Slavs and Latins. Of these a very large ma- 
jority were resolutely opposed to any alliance 
with Germany. The foreign policy of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy would have thus become 
progressively more independent of Berlin, and 
been drawn closer to Russia, France, and Eng- 
land. Germany would have been deprived of 
the artificial prop which the Germano-Magyar 
predominance at Vienna and Budapest had 
given her since the days of Sadowa, and William 
II. confronted by conditions opposing a bar- 
rier to his Oriental ambitions even more for- 
midable than that created by the Treaty of 
Bucharest. The Kaiser, therefore, decided 
to make war at once. 

The three determining causes in eastern 
Europe may be summed up in three lines: 

1. The defeat of Turkey by the Balkan 
peoples and Italy in 1912. 

2. The consequences of the Treaty of 
Bucharest. 

3. The internal evolution of Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The three anti-German barriers are shown 
on the map (p. 38) by broad black strokes; 
these barriers would have effectually broken 
up the Pangerman plan, and the Kaiser, fore- 



40 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

seeing this, had recourse to war, which Mira- 
beau pithily described long ago as "the na- 
tional industry of Prussia." 



CHAPTER IV. 

PANGERMANY IS MADE. 

I. The extent of the realization at the beginning of 1917 
of the Pangerman plan of 1911. 
II. Economic Pangermany. 
III. Military Pangermany. 

I. 

The Pangerman plan of 1911 (see map p. 12) 
comprehended : 

1. The formation of a great German Con- 
federation which was to put under the absolute 
supremacy of the present German Empire, with 
its 540,858 square kilometres and 68 million 
inhabitants, foreign territories situated around 
Germany, which have an area of 1,182,113 
square kilometres, and contain 94 million in- 
habitants. 

Early in 1917 the German seizures already 
effected in these territories amounted in the 
West to 90,478 square kilometres, in the East 
to 260,000, and in the South (Austria-Hungary) 
to 676,616, making a total of 1,027,094 square 

41 



42 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

kilometres. Germany has therefore, so far as 
concerns the territories to be absorbed into the 
Germanic Confederation, achieved her pro- 
gramme in the proportion of 86%, or about 
nine-tenths. 

2. The absolute subordination to Germany 
of all the Balkan States, with a superficies of 
499,275 square kilometres, holding 22 mil- 
lions of inhabitants. Here, in the begin- 
ning of 1917, the German seizure extended 
over about 285,585 square kilometers. The 
German programme concerning the Balkans 
had, therefore, been realized in the proportion 
of 57%. 

3. The German seizures, more or less dis- 
guised, in the Ottoman Empire, extended over 
1,792,900 square kilometres, holding 20 mil- 
lion inhabitants. Early in 1917 (not count- 
ing the portions of Persia occupied by the 
Turco-Germans, of which the area about bal- 
ances the Anglo-Russian occupations in Ar- 
menia and Mesopotamia) we may say that 
the whole of Turkey is under German influ- 
ence exclusively, and therefore the German 
plan has been realized in the proportion of 
100%. 

Let us now group together the figures which 
allow us to ascertain how nearly the general 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 



43 




44 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

plan of continental Pangermany, made in 1911, 
has been carried out in 1917. 





Forecast in 

1911. 

Square 

kilometres 


Realization in 

the beginning 

of 1917. 

Square 

kilometres 


I. 


Territories to be included 
in the great German 
Confederation 


1,182,113 

499,275 

1,792,900 


1,027,094 


IT, 


Balkans 


285,585 


m, 


Turkey 


1,792,900 




Total 






3,474,288 


3,105,579 









These figures are startling evidence that early 
in 1917 Germany had realized her Pangerman 
plan of 1911 in the enormous proportion of 89%, 
or almost nine-tenths. If to each of these 
totals we add the superficies of the German 
Empire, 540,858 square kilometres, we find the 
area of Pangermany, in round numbers, at the 
beginning of 1917, to be 3,600,000 square kil- 
ometres, a figure which comes very close to 
the 4,015,000 square kilometres which represent 
Pangermany in the plan of 1911. 

This figure is graphically confirmed by the 
map on p. 43. 

We can see at a glance the geographical as 
well as superficial relations which exist between 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 45 

the boundaries of the plan of 1911 and the 
fronts occupied early in 1917 by armies under 
the exclusive direction of Berlin. 



A new extension of Pangerman invasion 
took place in the second half of 1917, following 
the capture of Riga and the advance of the 
German armies in Russia. The figures given 
above are, therefore, considerably below the 
truth; the fact which they demonstrate is 
therefore still more convincing. 

Our conclusion from the foregoing state- 
ments must be that Germany exists no longer; 
there is only Pangermany. That is an essen- 
tial fact, of which the importance is not yet 
fully realized, and as a result the Allies still 
continue to speak of Germany, Austria-Hun- 
gary, or Turkey as if these States had remained 
in the same conditions in which they were 
before the war. But that is by no means the 
case. The Quadruple Alliance of Central Eu- 
rope is a great illusion, carefully fostered by the 
astute government at Berlin, because it is of 
the greatest service to their game. In reality 
Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary are 
not allies, but vassals of Berlin, and have less 
influence there than Saxony or Bavaria. 



46 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

As may be seen by a glance at the map on p. 
43, the effective forces of these three States are 
closely subordinated to the Prussian militarism 
which has helped Germany to reduce to prac- 
tical slavery 82 millions of Latins, Slavs and 
Semites, belonging to thirteen different nation- 
alities. The, governments of Constantinople, 
of Sofia, of Vienna, and of Budapest have a 
thousand reasons in common for complying 
with the orders of Berlin, from which this 
enormous whole is administered. 

Therefore, in order to reason clearly hence- 
forth, we must not see only Germany, but 
Pangermany; unless we do this, disastrous 
errors of judgment will be made by the Allies. 
It is only by examining, not Germany but the 
actual Pangermany, that is to say, a gigantic 
territory counting already at the present time 
about 176 million souls, that we can justly 
appreciate the resources of every kind, mili- 
tary and economical, which the government of 
Berlin has at its disposal; more particularly 
should we endeavor to form a clear idea of 
economic and also of military Pangermany, as 
one completes the other. 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 47 

II. 

Economic Pangermany, as it was formerly 
outlined by Teutonic economists such as List, 
Roscher, Rodbertus, etc., may be thus defined: 
A territory grouping together {solely under the 
supreme guidance of Berlin) Central Europe, 
the Balkans, and Turkey, this territory being vast 
enough to contain military and economic re- 
sources entirely sufficient for the needs of its 
population during war, and to insure its directors, 
in time of peace, domination over the world. 

As soon as the Hamburg-Bagdad railway was 
practically finished, the parcelling out of eco- 
nomic Pangermany was hastily carried on by 
Berlin under many widely different forms. 

Control of customs: As realization of the 
great Pangerman Zollverein, or Customs Union, 
was not possible all at once, the Kaiser's gov- 
ernment set about preparing the necessary 
steps. Numerous congresses were held in Ber- 
lin, attended by parliamentarians and men of 
business, German, Austrian, and Hungarian, 
who agreed on these three essential conclusions : 

1. An economic customs agreement, of long 
duration, in which Germany and Austria- 
Hungary should constitute an economic unit; 

2. In order to attain this by degrees, each side 



48 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

should add to the number of articles already 
free from customs duties, and should establish 
a unified tariff for certain sorts of merchandise; 
3. That Austro-Germany, Bulgaria, and Tur- 
key should be brought into close economic 
union as rapidly as possible. 

Ethnographic control: Certain populations 
considerably hinder the consolidation of the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan; the Serbian na- 
tion, whose spirit cannot be subdued, are an 
obstacle to the establishment of the Panger- 
man bridge or nexus between Hungary and Bul- 
garia, without which bridge all the Pangerman 
plan could not be realized. The systematic 
destruction of the Serbian nation was confided 
to the Bulgarians, who, under pretext of put- 
ting down insurrections, slew not only Serbian 
men of fighting age, but old people of both 
sexes, women, and children in arms. In the 
Ottoman Empire, the Armenians occupied the 
regions which were indicated by Herr Del- 
briick in the Reichstag long ago as destined 
to constitute Germanic India. Berlin utilized 
the hereditary Turkish liking for the massacre 
of Christians, and already more than a million 
Armenians have been wiped off the face of the 
earth. 

Agricultural control: The food crisis from 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 49 

which Germany suffers has determined Berhn 
to make all haste to profit by the rich agri- 
cultural regions which the war has brought 
under her power. She has, therefore, sent 
hundreds of agronomic engineers, with thou- 
sands of agricultural machines, to Roumania, 
to Serbia, and to Asia Minor. In this latter 
country two centres of cultivation have re- 
ceived especial attention; in the province of 
Adana the production of cotton is being de- 
veloped; on the Anatolian plains the intensive 
cultivation of cereals is pushed as fast as pos- 
sible. These energetic efforts will have this 
twofold result: the Turks will not rise against 
the German domination, or at least not be- 
cause of scarcity of food, and by means of the 
ever-increasing yield of Serbian, Roumanian, 
and Turkish soil, now scientifically treated, 
the food supply of the Central Powers will be 
more and more completely assured. 

Banking control: As the exploitation of 
Oriental Pangermany requires an immense 
amount of capital, the German, Austro-Hun- 
garian, Bulgarian, and Turkish banks have 
formed a group of powerful combinations. 
The leaders in Germany are the Deutsche 
Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and the Kolnische 
Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary, the Kredit 



50 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Anstalt in Vienna, and the Hungarian Bank of 
Credit in Budapest. 

Economic control: As the rapid development 
of the latent resources of the Balkans and 
Turkey is the chief economic objective of the 
Germans, they have recently established, in 
co-operation with King Ferdinand, an Institute 
for Improving Economic Relations between Ger- 
many and Bulgaria, and in order to facilitate 
German penetration in Turkey, ten thousand 
Turkish boys, from twelve to eighteen years of 
age are to come to Germany for their technical 
education. They will live in German families, 
learn the German language, and be saturated 
with German ideas, with the result that they 
will become useful underlings and efficient 
fellow workers with the real Germans toward 
the Germanization of Turkey, and also for ex- 
ploiting the concessions of every sort which 
the subjects of the Kaiser will exact from the 
Ottoman Government on account of the war. 

Railway control: The railway system through- 
out European Pangermany has been improved 
and perfected by every possible means; in 
Turkey all the roads are under the absolute 
control of German officers. Of the 2,435 kil- 
ometres which separate Haidar Pacha (Con- 
stantinople) from Bagdad only 583 kilometres 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 51 

are still to be built, and this distance is already 
crossed by automobile roads. 

Canal control: The canal project which was 
outlined by the Pangermanist, Doctor G. Zoepfl, 
at a congress held in Berlin as far back as 
April 26th, 1895, was taken up and followed 
by the Economic Congress of Central Europe 
which met at Berlin on the 19th of March, 
1917. 

This plan is made up of the following ele- 
ments: 1. Union of the Rhine and Danube by 
the adaptation of the Main to canal navigation 
and by the canal from the Main to the Danube; 
2. Completion of the central canal between the 
Vistula and Rhine; 3. Canal from the Oder to 
the Danube, uniting the Baltic and the Black 
Sea; 4. Adaptation of the Rhine as far as Basle; 
5. Union of the Weser and Main by means of 
the Fulda-Werra Rivers; 6. Union of the Elbe 
and Danube by the Moldau; 7. Union by means 
of canals of the Oder to the Danube and Vis- 
tula; 8. Union of the Danube and the Dniester 
by the Vistula; 9. Canalization of the Save; 
10. Canalization of the Morava and the Var- 
dar as far as Salonika. 

The Danube, being the most powerful flu- 
vial artery of central Pangermany, is the basis 
of this gigantic scheme. 



52 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

"The Danube means everything to us," de- 
clared General von Groener in December, 1916. 

This rapid sketch of the preparations now 
going on in economic Pangermany will enable 
any clear-sighted mind to understand the 
crushing power which this formidable organ- 
ism will possess when all these mighty resources 
have been developed by the Germans for the 
benefit of their supremacy. 

The organization of Pangermany is only be- 
ginning, and yet the economic forces which she 
is able to put at the service of Berlin are such 
as to permit Germany to keep up the war 
against enemies who, although much greater 
in number, are scattered. 

The German dogged power of work, spirit 
of enterprise, and skill in organization need 
no further demonstration. We must, there- 
fore, not doubt for a moment that they would 
draw, to their enormous advantage, all possi- 
ble profits from Austria-Hungary, where there 
are vast regions still to be turned to account. 
The same would apply to the Balkan countries, 
many of which are still entirely untouched, 
and which contain a considerable amount of 
unexplored sources of wealth, both agricul- 
tural and mineral. This would also be true 
of Asiatic Turkey. 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 53 

What intolerable authority would be wielded 
by an economic Pangermany, comprising nearly 
three millions of square kilometres, when once 
it was completely organized! It is obviously 
indisputable that the methodical turning to 
account, upon a great scale, of all the economic 
products of Pangermany, whether minerals or 
crops, live stock or manufactures, transported 
by cheap methods (such as a complete net- 
work of canals) would allow the Germans, even 
if they paid high wages to their own workmen, 
to reduce the cost price so considerably in all 
fields of production that the world would be 
forced to accept the products of Germany be- 
cause of their cheapness. Our own good sense 
should convince us that any economic renas- 
cence of the European countries now allied 
would be impossible in face of the overwhelm- 
ing methods of economic Pangermany. The 
economic ruin of the present Allies, following 
so onerous and exhausting a war as this one, 
would from the nature of things force them 
into political subjection to Berlin. Besides, 
not a single country in all the world could 
hold out against the pressure of economic 
Pangermany on the one hand, and on the 
other of the financial crises which would follow 
the irremediable ruin of the Allies. The fact 



54 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

that economic Pangermany is now being or- 
ganized is an ominous event on which the 
attention of all free peoples throughout the 
world should be concentrated, for it puts into 
the hands of Germany all the elements of an 
economic power which has no precedent in 
history. 

III. 

From this time forward Germany relies, 
above all else, on her military resources in 
order to establish indestructibly in the future 
the economic Pangermany which will be for 
her, in time of peace, an instrument for the 
permanent acquisition of wealth, and through 
this of world-wide domination. Military Pan- 
germany is, therefore, at once the complement 
and the guarantee of economic Pangermany. 
The seizure by Berlin, under cover of the war, 
of new sources of man-power (Austro-Hun- 
garian, Bulgarian, and Turkish contingents), 
and of bases or regions of exceptional strategic 
importance, either in the invaded districts or 
in the countries of her allies, has given Ger- 
many the foundations of military Panger- 
many. In 1914 the rigor of Prussian mili- 
tarism was only felt by the 68 million inhabi- 
tants of the German Empire; at the beginning 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 55 

of 1917 it was exercised, whether they wanted 
it or not, over about 176 miUion belonging to 
Pangermany (see maps pp. 12, 43). This re- 
sult, the evident consequence of an immense 
extension of exclusive influence throughout 
Central and Oriental Europe, has allowed the 
General Staff of Berlin to organize as it chose 
strategic bases and regions where, before the 
war, it could exercise no direct action. For 
instance, Zeebrugge, on the North Sea, Trieste, 
Pola, and Cattaro on the Adriatic, the Bul- 
garian coast of the iEgean, the Ottoman 
straits, and the Turkish, Bulgarian, and Rou- 
manian shores of the Black Sea have always 
been bases or regions of exceptional strategic 
value. This value is infinitely enhanced by 
the fact that these are now comprised in the 
military system which is subject only to the 
directing and organizing force of the General 
Staff at Berlin. 

At the present time the Pangerman frontier 
is on these essential strategic bases, which 
are connected, one with another, to form a 
series of continuous fronts, fortified more 
strongly than has ever been known before by 
an intensive system of barbed-wire entangle- 
ments, deep-dug underground shelters, machine- 
guns, and heavy artillery. 



5Q UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

The internal military organization of Pan- 
germany is being swiftly and steadily pursued. 
Munition factories are judiciously distributed 
throughout the country, in order to utiHze 
raw materials near where they are produced, 
and also to minimize the cost of transporta- 
tion, and render it easy to send abundant am- 
munition quickly to any front which may be 
menaced. Thus, at the beginning of the war, 
Krupp established a number of very impor- 
tant branch munition factories, not only in 
Bavaria but also in Bulgaria and Turkey. 

The system of strategic railways and auto- 
mobile roads in Pangermany is being every- 
where developed with great speed, especially 
in the Balkans and in Turkey, where it was 
relatively rudimentary. Behind every mili- 
tary front railways parallel to that front have 
been multiplied, to the end that reinforce- 
ments may be sent with the greatest possible 
haste to any sector threatened. All this has 
already made Pangermany into a gigantic and 
exceedingly strong fortress. 

A new phase is also in course of preparation. 
The Kaiser's General Staff, no longer content 
with holding high command over the various 
armies of Pangermany, also desires, as far as 
is possible, to standardize their weapons, their 



PANGERMANY IS MADE 57 

munitions, and their methods of instruction. 
Frederick Naumann, a deputy who is one of 
the protagonists of ^"^ Mitteleuropa,'' is obvi- 
ously preparing the way toward this end, 
which, for geographical reasons, must first 
touch Austria-Hungary. In the Vossische 
Zeitung Naumann has advocated a "full and 
complete community between the Central 
Empires in matters concerning military or- 
ganization." He adds firmly — and it is an 
avowal worth remembering — '^Mitteleuropa clearly 
exists to-day; she only lacks the organs of 
movement and action. These organs can be 
given her by our two Emperors, since they 
dispose of the elements which are fundamental 
for the creation of a common army."* It is 
evident that if this hypothesis of the standardi- 
zation of the armies of the two Central Empires 
is some day realized, neither Turkey nor Bul- 
garia, whose whole military resources seem 
likely to be used to their fullest extent by the 
German General Staff, could prevent the ab- 
sorption of their military organization into the 
bosom of Pangermany. 

It is easy to calculate the strength which the 
latter would be able to control. Even if Ger- 
many should evacuate Russia, Poland, Bel- 

* Le Temps of June 28th, 1917. 



58 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

gium, and France she would still include about 
150 millions of inhabitants. As she has mo- 
bilized about 20% of her own population and 
of those of her allies who have become her 
vassals, it is easy to see that central Panger- 
many can count upon approximately 30 mil- 
lions of soldiers. 

Prussian militarism^ whose annihilation by 
the Allies is the true, the legitimate, and essential 
aim of the war, has therefore become, by the carry- 
ing out of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, more 
wide-spread and more active than it was in 1914. 
The events which have already occurred, and 
those which are foreshadowed, show, in addi- 
tion, that Berlin, while pursuing with system- 
atic ardor a peace campaign intended to dupe 
and to separate the Allies, is taking every 
measure possible to make Pangermany into a 
fortress of a strength hitherto unknown. 



CHAPTER V. 

PACIFIST MANCEUVRES TO KEEP THE HAMBURG- 
PERSIAN GULF SCHEME FOR GERMANY AS A 
MINIMUM RESULT OF THE WAR. 

I. Strategic and economic conceptions of the German 
General Staflf upon which all pacifist manoeuvres 
are based. 
II. Separate peace to be made by Berlin with one of 
the Entente. The trick of Alsace-Lorraine. 

III. Separate peace to be made with the Entente by 

Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary. 

IV. The democratization of Germany. 

V. Peace by the "Internationale" or Socialist party. 
VI. The trick of an armistice. 

VII. The Drawn Game, or "Peace without annexations 
or indemnities." 
VIII. What is Germany's word worth? 

The mathematical and geographical evi- 
dence given in the preceding chapter, which 
establishes the fact that Pangermany is al- 
ready nine-tenths made (see map p. 43) en- 
ables us to see clearly why Germany has been 
anxious, since the end of 1915, to conclude 
peace. Berlin wants it simply because, as 
the Frankfurter Zeitung said with the utmost 
frankness at that time, the objects of the war 
had been attained. In December, 1916, one 

59 



60 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

of her allies. Count Karolyl, speaking in the 
Hungarian Chamber of Deputies, declared 
that "Germany is fighting for Berlin-Bag- 
dad."* Now the Berlin-Bagdad plan has 
been substantially realized since the end of 
1915, and the prolongation of the war (by 
giving all the nations of the world who were 
threatened by it time to understand the huge 
danger of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, a for- 
mula more exact than Berlin-Bagdad to explain 
the framework of the whole Pangerman plan) 
could only compromise and finally do away 
with the enormous results already achieved 
by Germany. The Berlin Government therefore 
wants peace — hut it wants a Pangerman peace, 
which will leave Germany the greatest advantage 
possible, whether through the seizures which she 
has made at the expense of her own allies, or 
through those which she has realized at the expense 
of the Entente. As Major Moraht said bluntly 
in the Berliner Tageblatt: "Our military lead- 
ers are not in the habit of giving up what it 
has cost us blood and sacrifice to gain."! 

But, as a coalition of three-fourths of the 
world was being organized, it was thought at 
Berlin that it would be skilful to appear to 

* Le Journal de Geneve, December 30th, 1916. 
t Le Matin, December 27th, 1915. 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 61 

yield just enough to break up this world-wide 
alliance. Germany therefore resolved to give 
up — if it was absolutely necessary, and moreover 
only for the moment — a fraction of the terri- 
tories which she had invaded in the east and 
those which she occupied in the west, in order 
to make sure, by indirect means (which, how- 
ever, should still have practical results) of those 
Pangerman seizures and advantages which 
were to her of vital importance. With this end 
in view Berlin has thought out the most sub- 
tle and ingenious manoeuvres, and is carrying 
them on with untiring persistence, thanks to 
her marvellous equipment for propaganda. 

Her one and only aim is to divide and dupe 
the Allies, that in the end she may at least 
keep Central Pangermany — that is to say the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf — which is the result of 
the hegemony established by Germany over Aus- 
tria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, because of 
the destruction of Serbia. For reasons which 
will be given in Chapter VI, Central Panger- 
many would provide Germany with all the 
means to carry out in full, and within a short 
time, her programme of universal domination. 



62 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

I. 

In order to grasp clearly the true meaning 
of the German pacifist manoeuvres (which are 
all only intended to secure possession of a 
maximum amount of invaded territory and hold 
seizures already made), we must have a clear 
idea of the strategic and economic plans of 
the General Staff at Berlin, upon which these 
manoeuvres are based. 

The Germans are intrenching themselves 
more and more strongly on all the fronts of 
Pangermany, which they have made into a gi- 
gantic fortress (see map on p. 63), by accumu- 
lating everywhere concrete trenches, deep-dug 
underground shelters, fields of barbed wire, 
machine-guns and heavy artillery, and by 
mobihzing, as in Germany, about 20% of the 
population of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey. Thanks to this organization, which 
is particularly strong in the west, the Germans 
hope to be able to continue resistance to the 
Allies until the enemy grows weary of the 
frightful struggle. The experience of the war 
having proved how extremely diflScult it is to 
pierce strongly fortified lines, the German Gen- 
eral Staff appears to have taken this knowl- 
edge as the base of the following calculation: 



PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 



63 




"We have achieved nine-tenths of the an- 
nexations on which we counted; only Calais, 
Verdun, Belfort, Riga, and Salonika are want- 



64 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

ing. We will try to obtain possession of these 
places if opportunity offers, if not, in order to 
avoid excessive risks, we shall remain every- 
where in Europe on a keen defensive, pretend- 
ing all the time that we wish to attack, in 
order to mislead our adversaries. If the Allies 
insist on concentrating their efforts above all 
against our lines of the eastern front, as these 
lines are manifold and constantly strengthened 
the enemy losses will be such that, even if they 
succeed in making us fall back by successive 
stages, their own forces will finally be so ut- 
terly exhausted that they will not be able to 
cross the Rhine. For that reason, therefore, 
they will be powerless to dictate peace to Ger- 
many, who will therefore remain mistress of 
Central Pangermany under such conditions 
that the Pangerman conquests in the west 
may be definitely realized once for all after a 
short respite." 

This strategic conception, which seems to 
be that of Hindenburg, is further based on the 
following economic considerations: The enor- 
mous fortress into which Pangermany has been 
made comprises such a vast territory that it 
contains, although undeveloped, all the food- 
stuffs essential to Germany and her allies. 
The only problem consists in creating an effec- 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 65 

tive organization quickly enough to draw out 
these latent resources in time to have them 
ready when they are needed. It is certain 
that the measures recently taken by the 
United States will make the blockade of the 
Central Powers by sea very stringent. The 
neutral States can only supply them to a lim- 
ited extent. Until hostilities are over Ger- 
many must go without certain products which 
need years for their cultivation, but as she 
has laid hands on more than half Roumania, 
and has taken possession of exceedingly fertile, 
although uncultivated, lands in the Balkans, 
and also in Asia Minor, it will be possible for 
her to prevent the food diflficulty from reach- 
ing an acute stage. 

That is why, for the last two years, those 
great tracts of country, whether already under 
cultivation or still virgin, have been brought 
gradually under intensive culture. The increas- 
ing production of cereals in that rich Oriental 
soil will solve the food problem. 

Germany and her vassals will, no doubt, be 
more or less pinched from an alimentary point 
of view, but, contrary to the belief held in 
many of the allied countries, they cannot be 
actually starved. Besides, the effects of the 
German submarine warfare, combined with the 



66 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

anarchy which has been let loose in Russia 
through German propaganda, will considerably 
diminish the food supplies of Germany's ad- 
versaries. Under these circumstances, and 
above all, thanks to the resources of Panger- 
many, Germany may hold out at least as long 
as the Allies. 



It would seem that those must be substan- 
tially the strategic and economic conceptions 
upon which the German Staff grounds its 
faith that the war can be carried on as long 
as is necessary. But as prolongation of the 
struggle carries with it the chances of various 
serious contingencies, Berlin would like to 
make an end of it under conditions allowing 
her to reserve a maximum amount of her 
seizures. That is the object of the German 
pacifist manoeuvres, some of the chief of 
which are exposed above. 

II. 

It is clear that the defection of one of the 
principal Allies would necessarily place the 
others in vastly more difficult positions for 
continuing the struggle. Assuming that such 
a thing were to happen, the Germans could. 



PACIFIST MAN(EUVEES 67 

indeed, hope to discuss peace on the base of 
the territories which they actually occupy. 
It is for that reason that they have made re- 
peated proposals for a separate peace to the 
Russians, as Berlin especially dreads their 
continuance in the war, on account of the in- 
exhaustible reserves of man-power still con- 
, tained in the old Empire of the Czars. The 
moment will probably come when the Ger- 
mans will also attempt to draw Italy out of 
the coalition by offering her Trent and per- 
haps even Trieste, at the expense of Austria; 
the latter concession, however, in the mind of 
Berhn, would be only for a very brief period. 

The Germans desire so strongly to break up 
the coalition at any price that we must be 
prepared to see them go so far, when the time 
comes, as to offer Alsace-Lorraine to France. 

We may judge how sincere such a proposi- 
tion would be by the words written by Maxi- 
milian Harden early in 1915: "If France be- 
heves that peace is only possible through the 
restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and if necessity 
obliges us to sign such an agreement, the seventy 
millions of our German people would soon tear 
it up," * Nothing indeed would be easier 
than for Germany, helped by the man-power 

* Le Temps, February 9th, 1916. 



68 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

of Central Pangermany, speedily to retake 
Alsace-Lorraine, even if she ceded it for a 
short time as a tactical measure. 

The allied State which, contrary to its 
solemn agreement, should separately treat with 
Berlin would be punished for its infamy with- 
out delay. By allowing Germany to conclude 
peace more or less on the basis of the terri- 
tories she holds at present, it would find itself 
at once confronted by a formidable Germanic 
Empire, and would inevitably soon become one 
of its future victims. 

III. 

One of the most astute manoeuvres of Ber- 
lin consists in secretly favoring — not perhaps 
a treaty of peace formally signed — ^but official 
negotiations for a separate peace between one 
of her allies, Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria- 
Hungary — and the Entente. 

The advantage to be gained from this arti- 
fice will be readily seen from its bearing on 
the definite consolidation of the Hamburg- 
Persian Gulf, if one imagines the Allies con- 
cluding a yeace by negotiation, from weariness, 
with Turkey, for instance. On this hypothesis, 
the Allies could only treat with Germany's 
liegemen at Constantinople, for all the other 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 69 

elements having any value whatever in Turk- 
ish politics are already suppressed. Now, if the 
Allies were to deal with the Ottoman Govern- 
ment, dripping with the blood of a million Ar- 
menians, Greeks, and Arabs massacred whole- 
sale because they were anti-Germanic and 
friends of the Entente, the result of the negotia- 
tion would be as follows : The Entente, by con- 
doning the unheard-of crimes committed in Tur- 
key would abandon her moral standards; she 
could never again pretend that she was fighting 
in the cause of civilization. The Turkish Gov- 
ernment, which is notoriously made up of 
assassins, would be officially recognized, and 
the group of men who sold the Ottoman Em- 
pire to Germany would be confirmed in power. 
Their leader, Talaat Pacha, declared in the 
Ottoman Chamber in February, 1917: "We 
are bound to the Central Powers for life or 
death." * The seizure of the Ottoman straits 
by Germany, a strategic position of immense 
and universal value, to be held by her accom- 
plices, would be confirmed; the many agree- 
ments signed in Berlin in January, 1917, estab- 
lishing a stringent German protectorate over 
all Turkey, would be in full force during a 
Pangerman peace. 

* Le Matin, February 17th, 1917. 



70 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Bulgarian intrigues for a pretended sepa- 
rate peace with the Alhes have been at least 
as numerous as Turkish manoeuvres of the 
same description. As a matter of fact, the 
Bulgarian agents who were sent to Switzer- 
land, apparently for the purpose of opening 
tempting negotiations with the official rep- 
resentatives of the Entente, were working in 
concert with Berlin, and their real object was 
to sound the Allies in order to find out to what 
extent they were weary of the war. The Bul- 
garians have never been really disposed to 
make a treaty of peace with the Alhes on any 
equitable terms; they want a peace which 
will insure them enormous advantages at the 
expense of the Greeks, the Roumanians, and 
above all the Serbians, for Sofia's chief desire 
is to be in direct geographic contact with 
Austria-Hungary. Therefore the Allies cannot 
have dealings with Bulgaria without commit- 
ting themselves to the infamy of sacrificing 
their smaller Balkan allies and accepting terri- 
torial conditions which would allow Bulgaria 
to form a Pangerman bridge between Hungary 
and Turkey, over the corpse of Serbia. This 
bridge is indispensable to the working of the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, and therefore to 
Central Pangermany, and is precisely the result 



PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 71 

of the war which Bulgaria wants most of all. 
The King of Bulgaria declared in the Neues 
Tagehlatt of Stuttgart, in August, 1917: "The 
economic future of Bulgaria depends on her 
close connection with Germany and Austria." * 
Further, Doctor Friedrich Naumann, one of 
the most ardent advocates of the Hamburg- 
Persian Gulf, said in a pamphlet which he pub- 
Hshed at Berlin in 1916, under the title of Bul- 
garia and Mitteleuropa, that he had found from 
investigations made in Bulgaria that the pros- 
pect of a close union with the Germanic Empires 
was hailed with real enthusiasm. 

A peace made by negotiation between the 
Allies and Bulgaria, which would in reality be 
a peace made because of weariness, would only 
lend further sanction to these conditions. 

It is also true that a peace by negotiation 
between the Allies and Austria-Hungary could 
only definitely consolidate the Hamburg-Per- 
sian GuK. Both from a miHtary and from 
a financial standpoint the monarchy of the 
Hapsburgs is, as a State, absolutely dependent 
on Germany. The Hapsburg Emperor, no 
matter what his own feelings may be, can do 
nothing without Hohenzollern consent. Any 
peace signed by Vienna would have its condi- 

* Le Matin, August 14th, 1917. 



72 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

tions practically arranged by Berlin. It is 
well to have no illusions. Only a complete vic- 
tory hy the Allies will force Germany to give up 
her seizure of Austria-Hungary, for that seizure 
is to her the indispensable result of the war. 

It is that seizure which, because of its geo- 
graphic, military, and economic value insures 
to Berlin domination over the Balkans and the 
Orient, and therefore over Central Panger- 
many and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf strip, 
with all the momentous consequences which 
their possession entails. 

Let us be firmly assured that all attempts at 
a separate peace on the part of Turkey, Bul- 
garia, or Austria-Hungary which have taken 
place already or which may take place in the 
future are only, and can only be, manoeuvres 
having in view a peace said to be by negotiation, 
which would be merely a cloak for a peace not 
only German but Pangerman. 

Furthermore, the Allies should clearly un- 
derstand that if they really wish to destroy 
Prussian militarism, so that it cannot again 
exist, they must at the same time put an end 
to the neo-imperialism of the Turks and Pan- 
islamists, Balkan imperiahsm in Bulgaria, Aus- 
trian imperialism at Salonika, and the feudal 
imperialism of the Magyars — that is to say, four 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 73 

secondary imperialisms, dangerous in a high 
degree, as they are the complements of German 
imperialism, and would, if allowed to exist, per- 
mit a revival of Prussian militarism. 

Now, these four secondary imperialisms can- 
not possibly be destroyed by a peace by nego- 
tiation, which would only be the outcome of war- 
weariness ; they must perish thr'ough a military 
victory on the part of the Allies — that is to say, 
by intelligent strength serving the cause of justice. 

IV. 

As some of the allied groups appeared to 
believe that the "democratization" of Ger- 
many would suffice to end Prussianism and Ger- 
man imperialism automatically, Berlin came 
to the conclusion that at least a certain part 
of them, tired of fighting, would content them- 
selves with merely nominal amends, in order 
to end the war. That is the reason why Ber- 
lin, in order to throw dust in the eyes of the 
Allies, and make them willing to enter into 
negotiations, lent herself increasingly, during 
the first six months of 1917, to the comedy 
of "the democratization of Germany." Dur- 
ing this period the most avowed Pangermans 
bridled their utterances. They spoke no more 



74 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

of annexations nor of war indemnities. They 
only talked of "special political organizations," 
which in their own minds meant the same re- 
sult, but which had the advantage of not 
hindering the action of those pacifists in the 
allied countries who wanted peace at any price. 
The manoeuvre of the "democratization of 
Germany" was supplemented by that of the 
Stockholm congress, which, as we know, was 
above all meant to convince Russian Socialists 
that Russia had nothing to gain by going on 
with the war, since Germany in her turn was 
firmly resolved to tread the path of democ- 
racy, etc. 

We must acknowledge that many of the 
Allies were, for a time, taken in by this 
game, and honestly believed that Germany 
meant seriously to undertake. internal reforms. 
But when these tactics had had the tremen- 
dous result of letting anarchy loose in Russia 
(a state of things which was at once taken 
advantage of by the General Staff of Berlin), 
the comedy of "the democratization of Ger- 
many" was withdrawn. The Chancellor, Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, was sacrificed because it was 
necessary to stop a movement which he had 
been directing, and was replaced by Michaelis, 
Hindenburg's man, who therefore stood for the 



PACIFIST MAN(EUVRES 75 

Prussian military party and ultra-Pangerman- 
ism. 

As this manoeuvre of the *' democratization 
of Germany" is sure to be tried many times, 
it is in the highest degree important that the 
Alhes should not again be duped by it. They 
can never sufficiently safeguard themselves 
against bad faith on Germany's part. Should 
a German republic be established, the result 
would, no doubt, be serious, but even then the 
most 'positive and most effective measures should 
be taken by the Allies themselves, if they ^really 
wish to put an end to huge armaments and prevent 
any recrudescence of German militarism. 

Good sense would seem to indicate the de- 
struction of all German munition factories as 
among the most important of these measures 
on the part of the Allies; destruction which 
would only be complete if the Allies did it 
themselves or had it done under their direct 
supervision. Without that indispensable pre- 
caution — to say nothing of many others — the 
sacrifices of the Allies during the war would 
have been made in vain. 

Indeed, the Germans have always had such 
an inveterate taste for rapine that they are 
perfectly capable of forming a great military 
republic and submitting themselves volun- 



76 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

tarily to Prussian discipline in order to be able 
to start new and great wars for the sake of 
plunder. 

This truth should be ever in our minds. If, 
in Mirabeau's words, the Hohenzollerns have 
been able to make war "the national in- 
dustry" of the Germans, it is because, since 
the beginning of history, the Germans have 
always subordinated everything else to their 
passion for lucrative fighting. And such is still 
the case. For the last twenty years especially 
the Berlin Government has instilled into the 
people that the creation of Pangermany would 
insure theqi great material advantages. It is 
because that conviction is firmly rooted in their 
minds that almost all the Socialist workmen 
serve the Kaiser without flinching, and are 
content to suffer all the horrors of the present 
war so long as they are not defeated by force 
of arms. 

"During the war," said M. E. Laskine,* 
"the organs of the workmen's syndicates have 
given the most constant and solid support to 
the policy of aggression and conquest. The 
Internationale Korrespondenz, published in the 
name of the General Commission of Syndi- 
cates by Legien and Bauermeister, affirms that 

* Le Matin, August 27th, 1917. 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 77 

Germany has a right to 'sohd guarantees,' 
whether furnished by annexations or by 'eco- 
nomic ties.' Emil Kloth, president of the 
syndicate of bookbinders, was applauded by 
the Kreuzzeitung , the organ of the Junker 
squires, for declaring himself as opposed to 
the independence of Belgium. On the 24th 
of October, 1914, we might have read in the 
Kurier, which is the mouthpiece of the power- 
ful syndicate of transportation workers, this 
statement: 'The German flag now floats over 
the towers of Antwerp — let us hope forever.' '' 

Thus even the German Social Democrats use 
glibly expressions such as "solid guarantees" 
and "economic ties," which, in their practical 
application, insure the consolidation of Cen- 
tral Pangermany. It is impossible to doubt 
that the Pangerman spirit has penetrated into 
the very soul of the German working classes. 
As this state of feeling has been in accord with 
German psychology for hundreds of years, we 
should be singularly credulous to imagine that 
a few measures of "democratization," more 
formal than actual, could change the mental 
attitude of the German people. To obtain this 
result other and more appropriate measures 
must be taken. 



78 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

V. 

Peace through the Internationale is yet an- 
other device invented at Berlin. In fact, as 
the Internationale has always followed the 
guidance of the German Marxists, it has been 
the chief means employed during the last 
thirty years to deceive the Socialists of the 
countries now allied, by making them believe 
that, thanks precisely to the Internationale, 
war could never come again. In a report upon 
**The International Relations of German Work- 
men's Unions," published in Berlin by Hey- 
mann in 1914, the Imperial Bureau of Statistics 
could announce, on p. 19, as an incontestable 
truth, that "In almost all international organ- 
izations German influence is predominant."* 

The proposed congress at Stockholm, which 
was suggested by German agents, and that at 
Berne, for which they are working now, are 
measures set on foot by German syndicalism 
in order to regain in all countries the German 
influence which has been lost by the war. It 
is a question of subjecting the proletariat of 
the world to German guidance. The end offi- 
cially avowed is to restore the Internationale in 
the interests of democracy, but as a matter of 

* M. E. Laskine; Le Matin, August 27th, 1917. 



PACIFIST MANOEUVRES 79 

fact it is above all to bring class antagonism 
again to the fore in all the allied countries, in 
order to destroy the sacred union which alone 
will allow parties of widely differing opinions 
to carry on the war against Pangerman Ger- 
many with vigor. The government of Berlin 
is well aware that it has nothing to fear from 
its Socialists, of whom the great majority, even 
when they refuse to call themselves Panger- 
mans, are in favor of Central Pangermany. 
Any profit from this manoeuvre, based on the 
Internationale, would accrue to Germany, who 
would keep her powers of moral resistance in- 
tact, while the allied States, again the prey of 
the most intense social disruptions, would find 
their powers of offensive so diminished that 
peace would finally be made on the basis of 
the actual German occupations of territory. 

VI. 

All the foregoing manoeuvres, whether em- 
ployed separately or in combination, are in- 
tended to play the "armistice trick" on the 
Allies. This is the result of crafty calculation, 
founded on the fatigue of the combatants, 
which is easily to be explained by such an ex- 
hausting war. Berlin follows this reasoning, 



80 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

which has a certam psychological merit: "If 
an armistice were signed, the allied soldiers 
would think: 'They are talking, therefore it 
means peace, and demobilization will soon fol- 
low.' Under these conditions the effect will 
be the moral slackening of our adversaries." 
The Germans could not ask for anything better. 
They would open peace negotiations with the 
following astute idea: Assuming that the Allies 
committed the enormous mistake of discussing 
peace on such treacherous terms, Germany, 
still intrenched behind her fronts, which would 
have been rendered almost impregnable, would 
end by saying to the Allies: *'I don't agree 
with you. After all you cannot exact of me 
that I should evacuate territories from which 
you are powerless to drive me. If you are not 
satisfied, continue the war." As, while nego- 
tiations were pending, all needful steps would 
have been taken by German agents to aggra- 
vate the moral slackening of the soldiers of the 
allied country which had felt the strain of the 
war most (as they succeeded in doing in Rus- 
sia, during the first days of the revolution), 
the huge military machine of the Allies could 
not again be put in motion as a whole. The 
real result would be, in fact, the rupture of 
the anti-Germanic coalition, and finally the 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 81 

conclusion of a peace based nearly on actual 
occupation. Berlin would thus have gained 
her end. 

VII. 

The last German manoeuvre, and the most 
dangerous of all, is one which I foresaw in the 
beginning of 1916 as likely to be attempted as 
soon as Germany found it necessary to make 
peace quickly, in order, above all, to save the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf. I said then: "Peti- 
tions against territorial annexations will be 
multiplied on the other side of the Rhine. In 
an underhand way they will be favored by the 
government of Berlin, which will end by saying 
to the Allies: 'Let us stop killing each other. 
I am perfectly reasonable. I give up my 
claims on such of your territories as are occu- 
pied by my armies. Let us negotiate peace 
on the basis of the "drawn game."'" 

This was exactly what happened when 
about April, 1917, the snare of the "drawn 
game" was hidden under the formula of 
"peace without annexations or indemnities," 
which the government of Berlin suggested to 
the Russian Socialists through the innumerable 
agents which she maintains in the former Em- 
pire of the Czars. This formula has since then 



82 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

been the basis of so much discussion that it is 
of the highest importance to show in a sep- 
arate chapter what in reahty lurks behind 
those words, "peace without annexations or 
indemnities." It is certain that if the trick 
of "the apparently drawn game" should suc- 
ceed it would, in reality, conceal a formida- 
ble success for Germany and an irremediable 
catastrophe for the Allies and for the freedom 
of the world. 

VIII. 

Repeated lessons from German history, and 
those which have been learned in the present 
war, make it imperative that the Allies should 
not put the slightest confidence in the Ger- 
mans. The treaties which they sign in the 
most solemn manner are only "scraps of 
paper," the obligations of which they only re- 
spect in the measure of their own interest. 
This is overwhelmingly proved by Berlin's 
cynical violation of the treaty guaranteeing 
the neutrality of Belgium, which was signed in 
London by Prussia on June 26th, 1831. It is a 
fact that the Germans, almost to a man, only 
respect might; and this they proclaim them- 
selves. Referring to the submarine warfare 
on the coast of Norway, the Frankfurter Zeitung 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 83 

did not hesitate to say: "Justice no longer ex- 
ists. Only strength counts, and we have still 
strength to spare. Norway has felt it." * 

The Kaiser himself, in the course of a con- 
versation about submarine warfare with Mr. 
Gerard, the American ambassador at Berlin, 
said to him: "There are no more interna- 
tional laws."t A Grand Duke of Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin announced to Mr. Gerard that: "We 
care nothing for treaties." { On July 10th, 
1917, the Reichstag passed a vote for a so- 
called amicable peace, without annexations, 
which the Chancellor then seemed to approve. 
But when the results of this manoeuvre, com- 
bined with the measure called the "democrati- 
zation of Germany," were shown by the letting 
loose of Russian anarchy, and the adhesion to 
the principles of the Stockholm congress by 
some groups of French and English Socialists 
who were particularly credulous, and ignorant 
of the formidable realities of the war map, the 
Chancellor, Michaelis, declared on August 
22d, before a committee of the Reichstag: "I 
never said that I agreed with the peace reso- 
lution which was proposed by the parties 

* Le Temps, November 19th, 1916. 
t Le Matin, August 16th, 1917. 
i Le Temps, August 10th, 1917. 



84 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

forming a majority in the Reichstag and 
adopted by that assembly on the 19th of last 
July. In any case, I wish to state that I did 
not accept any terms of peace, as I must natu- 
rally reserve my freedom of action for peace nego- 
tiations." * As the cynicism of this speech 
was considered likely to hinder further peace 
manoeuvres, the Chancellor pretended later 
that he had only made a slip of the tongue, 
and that he upheld the peace formula voted 
by the Reichstag on July 19th. After words 
as plain as those used by him on August 22d, 
this excuse of a lapsus linguce can only cheat 
those who wish to be cheated. 

This incident, coming after so many others, 
and after such a number of unquestioned facts, 
does not leave the least room for hesitation. 
The Allies should be convinced that no faith can 
be placed in the German word. All the pacifist 
manoeuvres of Berlin have but one object — 
to separate and dupe the Allies by means of 
negotiations which will be followed by a re- 
fusal to accept the terms apparently agreed 
upon, and Germany will hold her positions on 
the war map, and at least Central Pangermany. 
In the end of 1916 the Frankfurter Zeitung 
warned its readers very plainly of the exact 

* Le Journal, August 24th, 1917. 



PACIFIST MANCEUVRES 85 

spirit in which all German pacifist manoeuvres 
should be undertaken: **This is the point of 
view to-day: to formulate our demands pre- 
cisely in the East, and in the West to negotiate 
on a basis which may be modified. Negotia- 
tion is not synonymous with renunciation.'"'^ 

To sum up: Unless they are wiUing to be 
frightfully and unpardonably duped, the Allies 
will not allow themselves to be taken in by any 
German manoeuvres framed to induce them to 
negotiate before they have gained a military 
victory, of which the first proof having any 
real value will be the retirement of all German 
officers and soldiers from: 1. All the invaded 
territories of the Entente. 2. All the terri- 
tories in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, 
and any parts of Central Pangermany now held 
under military occupation by the Germans as 
a result of the war. 

*L'Echo de Paris, December 30th, 1916. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE "DRAWN GAME"; THE INSIDIOUS SNARE OF 
THE FORMULA, "PEACE WITHOUT ANNEXA- 
TIONS OR INDEMNITIES." 

I. How the hypothesis is brought forward. 
II. Cost of the war much greater to the AUies than to 
the Germans. 
ni. The struggle has allowed Germany to obtain enor- 
mous advantages in the present and for the future. 
IV. The war has brought the Allies only losses. 
V. Consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan in 
regard to Russia and Asia. 
VI. The blatant falsehood of the formula, "Peace with- 
out annexations or indemnities." 
VII. The formidable danger of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf 
plan to the Allies. 

I. 

It is important first of all to have a clear idea 
how and under what circumstances the hy- 
pothesis of the "drawn game," or "peace with- 
out annexations or indemnities" has been pre- 
sented. This formula was proposed to the 
Russians by the numerous agents whom the 
Germans had been able to smuggle into the 
Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates 
of Petrograd at the beginning of the revolu- 
tion. This amazing manoeuvre met with suc- 

86 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 87 

^cess because in this famous Soviet there were 
tank traitors, unmasked later, Hke Lenine and 
his accomplices, and also Socialists who were 
well-meaning but so densely ignorant, not only 
of the Pangerman plan, but even of what was 
important and necessary for Russia, that in a 
few weeks their ardent but unpractical plans 
had gravely aggravated the Russian situation, 
already serious enough under the Czar, and 
had plunged their country not only into an- 
archy, but also into extraordinary difficulties, 
political, financial, and economic. Whatever 
the reason, on March 28th, 1917, the Soviet 
proclaimed the formula, "peace without an- 
nexations or indemnities," with which it had 
been supplied from Berlin. On June 12th, 
1917, the imperiahstic German SociaHsts who 
had been delegated to Stockholm by the 
Kaiser's government also declared for the 
adoption of a programme of peace, with "nei- 
ther annexations nor indemnities." On July 
19th, 1917, at the intervention of Erzberger, 
one of its deputies, the Reichstag voted a peace 
resolution "rejecting the idea of acquiring ter- 
ritory by force," and declared that "the 
Reichstag seeks an amicable peace. . . . Any 
violent action, political, economic, or social, is 
incompatible with such a peace." 



88 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Now this formula, due to the intervention of 
the deputy Erzberger, rejecting any idea of 
"annexations or indemnities," was intended to 
be combined with the intervention of the Pope, 
which had been already arranged by this same 
Erzberger. Indeed, in the spring of 1917, 
therefore several months before the vote of 
the Reichstag on July 19th, Erzberger founded 
"the Cathohc International Peace League" in 
Switzerland. This organization, which was 
made up of Germans, Austrians, and a few 
Swiss Catholics, was directed by Erzberger, 
and its object was to bring pressure to bear 
upon the Vatican. A deputation from this 
league went to Rome in June, 1917, to beseech 
the Pope to make proposals of peace. On Au- 
gust 1st, 1917, Pope Benedict XV (who had in 
the meantime been implored to intervene by 
the Emperor and Empress of Austria) advanced 
in his turn the formula of "peace without an- 
nexations or indemnities"; he was noticeably 
careful not to condemn the crimes of Ger- 
many, and said nothing about the many for- 
midable Oriental problems. The Messagero of 
Rome explained this silence: "Benedict XV 
thinks that the door of the East should be left 
open, or at least ajar, for Austria-Hungary, and 
through her for Germany. Complete restitu- 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 89 

tion of territory to Serbia and Roumania would 
mean that the highway of the Danube has 
been brought back into ante-bellum condi- 
tions, and that the road to the East is barred 
in the same way as before the war." * It is 
true that in his letter the Pope only made a 
clear pronouncement as to the restitutions to 
be made by Germany in the west and the 
east; he said absolutely nothing as to the ter- 
ritories necessary for maintaining Central Pan- 
germany. That is an essential fact which it is 
necessary to notice and to remember. It must 
also be noted that some groups of French and 
English Socialists, as ignorant as their Russian 
brethren concerning the realities of the war 
map and the Pangerman plan, have also 
adopted the formula of ** peace without an- 
nexations or indemnities," evidently not un- 
derstanding its formidable consequences, po- 
litical, economic, and military, which will be 
set forth later. It is certain that the effect of 
an intensive German propaganda has been to 
have this formula of "peace without annexa- 
tions or indemnities" (which is part of the 
vast encircling manoeuvre of Berlin) adopted 
both by the most anarchistic of the Russian 
maximalists, and by the most ultramontane 

* Le Temps, August 18th, 1917. 



90 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

followers of the Vatican. On the face of it, 
the German formula, which is summed up in 
the words "the drawn game," would seem to 
mean that each country should keep the same 
frontiers as before the war; also that each 
country should bear the burden of the outlays 
it had made during the struggle. 

But in order to prove beyond doubt and 
most emphatically what is really concealed 
in this apparent German concession, we will 
argue on a hypothesis infinitely more favorable 
for the western Allies than that of the "drawn 
game." We will suppose (see map on p. 91) 
that Germany should declare herself finally 
disposed, not only to evacuate altogether Po- 
land, the French departments, Belgium, and 
Luxemburg, hut also to restore Alsace-Lorraine 
to France, and even, let us still further suppose, to 
give as an indemnity all the rest of the left hank 
of the Rhine, under the sole and tacit condition 
that Germany should keep her preponderating 
influence, direct or indirect, over Austria-Hun- 
gary, the Balkans and Turkey. 

If matters are probed to the bottom it will 
be easily seen that, should the Allies negotiate 
peace with Germany on such a basis, the resti- 
tution of Alsace-Lorraine could only be tem- 
porary, for a peace like that would secure to 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 



91 




Germany all the elements of power which 
would allow her, after a very short respite, to 
retake Alsace-Lorraine, and in the end to over- 



92 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

come all the Allies and to achieve in its en- 
tirety the Pangerman plan, not only in Europe 
but in Asia, and even throughout the world. 



To give up the left bank of the Rhine, ac- 
cording to our hypothesis, would mean for 
Germany the loss of 47,450 square kilometres, 
and 10 million inhabitants. The present Ger- 
man Empire would therefore be reduced to 
493,408 square kilometres and 58 million in- 
habitants. But this loss in the west would 
be far more than counterbalanced by the close 
union of Austria-Hungary to the German Em- 
pire, which would be none the less real because 
it would be disguised. On this reckoning Ber- 
lin's influence would be exercised directly and 
absolutely over the German Empire, curtailed 
in the west, with 493,408 square kilometres 
and 58 million inhabitants, and Austria-Hun- 
gary, with 676,616 square kilometres and 50 
million inhabitants. 

It is evident that a solid block of States, 
established in Central Europe under the di- 
rection of Berlin, would exercise, simply by 
contiguity, an absolutely preponderant pres- 
sure on 499,275 square kilometres in the Bal- 
kans, with a population of 22 millions, and in 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 93 

Turkey on 1,792,000 square kilometres, with 
a population of 20 millions, making a total of 
2,291,275 square kilometres, holding 42 milUon 
inhabitants. 

Therefore Berlin's preponderating influence 
would be wielded, directly or indirectly, over 
3,461,299 square kilometres, holding 172 mil- 
lions of inhabitants. We now see clearly that 
in the end the trick of the "drawn game" 
would really lead to the consoHdation of Cen- 
tral Pangermany, as summed up in the formula 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf, resulting in formidable 
consequences, financial, political, and economic. 
As these would be felt universally, it is impor- 
tant that we should fully realize them. 

II. 

Because it was planned long ago, and there- 
fore slowly prepared for, the war has cost Ger- 
many infinitely less than it has her adversa- 
ries. There are six fundamental reasons which 
combine to give Berlin the advantage, and are 
consequently detrimental to the Allies. 

1. Germany has not had to suffer from the 
effects of improvising war material, which is 
always ruinously expensive. 

2. Workmen's wages in Germany, judging 



94 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

from peace times, are lower than those paid in 
the allied countries. 

3. Careful German preparedness enabled 
them to avoid enormous waste of raw mate- 
rials in munition factories and in food supplies. 

4. Two milHons of prisoners and nearly 42 
million inhabitants of the territories occupied 
by the Germans give them a prodigious amount 
of almost free labor on which to draw, and of 
this they avail themselves largely. 

5. The iron, coal, and copper mines and the 
petroleum wells seized by the Germans in Po- 
land, Serbia, Belgium, and France allow them 
to make munitions at a comparatively low net 
cost. 

6. The geographical conditions of Panger- 
many are such that German transportation of 
every sort is infinitely cheaper than with the 
Allies. 

These six factors affect the general expenses 
of the war to a very large degree. It is posi- 
tive that Germany is running the war under 
conditions much less onerous than those of 
the Allies. 

This is easily further proved by a couple of 
figures. During the three years of the war 
Germany, with 68 million inhabitants, has 
spent about 115 milliards, while France, with 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 95 

only 40 million, lias spent 100 milliards. In 
France the State has therefore spent at the 
rate of nearly 2,500 francs a head, while the 
German State has spent only about 1,690 
francs a head. A comparison of the relative 
war expenses of the two groups of belligerents 
will make this demonstration yet more striking. 

III. 

Setting aside the inevitable losses which 
Germany, like any belhgerent, has suffered be- 
cause of the war, such as the stoppage of ex- 
portations with the consequent heavy fall in 
exchange, loss of ships, etc., we must bear 
clearly in mind that Germany alone, of all the 
combatants, has made profits which far exceed 
her losses. 

This question of the advantages which Ger- 
many has secured from the war, both in the 
present and for the future, is (if conditions 
such as they are now should continue) of such 
paramount importance that it amounts to a 
special and separate subject. In this book I 
can only point out that these profits are mainly 
due to seven chief causes. 

First source of war profits: The stupendous 
amount of plunder seized by the Germans in the 



96 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

500,000 square kilometres which they hold in 
Montenegro, in Albania, in Serbia, in Rouma- 
nia, in Russia, in Belgium, and in France. 

This booty is made up of human beings and 
supplies of various kinds, such as free labor, 
military stores, foodstuffs, minerals, raw and 
manufactured materials, movable objects such 
as art treasures and jewels, forced contribu- 
tions, specie, and securities, and has been sys- 
tematically collected by the Germans for the 
past three years. It certainly represents a 
value of several tens of billions of francs. The 
value of the territories occupied by Germany, 
judging by estimates made before the war, 
may be reckoned at about 155 bilKons of 
francs. 

Second source of war profits: Pangerman 
mortgages on her allies held by Berlin. Ger- 
many has turned the war to account by swin- 
dling her own allies; in order to enable them 
to carry on the war (always, moreover, to her 
advantage) she has made them loans which 
were not burdensome to her, since they were 
only on paper. Now, by the effect of these 
loans (which, considering the circumstances 
and the terms of their fulfilment, constitute a 
new form of "kolossal" knavery) Austria-Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, which represent 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 97 

a total of 2,583,000 square kilometres, and 
which are countries, as the map on p. 43 shows, 
indispensable to the carrying out of Central Pan- 
germany and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, are 
heavily mortgaged for the benefit of Germany. 
These mortgages are combined with economic 
or poHtical agreements made during the war 
between the government at Berlin on the one 
hand, and those of Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, 
and Constantinople on the other. The trea- 
ties signed at Berlin on January 11th, 1917, 
may be especially instanced, as they practically 
put Turkey under a German protectorate. 
The result of these loans and agreements (to 
which should be added military direction by 
the General Staff of Berlin) has been to put 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whose 
national riches were valued before the war at 
about 269 billion francs, absolutely under the 
hegemony of Prussia. 

Third source of war profits: The value of the 
sole right to develop the latent resources of the 
Balkans and Turkey. The Balkans and the 
Ottoman Empire contain enormous riches, both 
mineral and agricultural, which are still unde- 
veloped, and therefore not yet estimated. 
The treaties made during the war between 
Berlin, Sofia, and Constantinople practically 



98 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

put this development almost wholly into Ger- 
man hands. 

Fourth source of war profits: Value resulting 
from the creation of economic Pangermany. It 
is clear that if the economic Pangermany (see 
Chapter IV., II.), based on the Hamburg-Per- 
sian Gulf, which the Germans are beginning to 
organize, is to endure and fulfil its natural 
consequences, the trade and industry of every 
other country in the world will find it abso- 
lutely impossible to struggle against so for- 
midable an organization. The fact that Ger- 
many has laid hands on the territory of 
economic Pangermany, which is intended to be 
a permanent source of wealth, may surely be 
considered a war profit. It is true that this 
profit cannot be estimated in exact figures, 
but their sum must certainly be gigantic. 

Fifth source of war profits: The value of mili- 
tary Pangermany (see Chapter IV., III.), as this 
is a guarantee of the duration of economic Pan- 
germany. 

Sixth source of war profits: The value of the 
enormous economic profits which Pangermany 
will make for Germany at the expense of Russia. 

It stands to reason that if Pangermany is to 
exist by cutting Europe in two, her economic 
and military pressure will be irresistible in the 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 99 

east. Russia will finally break up into groups 
of anarchical republics, and Germany's influ- 
ence will predominate in the development of 
the enormous immense natural wealth of Euro- 
pean and Asiatic Russia. 

Seventh source of war profits : The substitution 
of Germany for France, in 21 billion francs at 
least of French loans to Russia, Austria-Hun- 
gary, the Balkans, and Turkey, these loans pass- 
ing as a matter of fact to Germany in conse- 
quence of the establishment of Central Pan- 
germany. The variety of these war profits is 
so great and the mortgages which they impose 
upon the present and the future so far-reaching 
that it is impossible to calculate them exactly, 
but if we could do so the total sum would 
surely be extraordinary. 

In three years of war Germany has only 
spent -about 115 billions of francs. If in our 
minds we deduct this sum from that of her 
war profits one may well imagine that, count- 
ing the present and looking to the future, she 
has made hundreds of billions. Therefore the 
war still going on has brought Germany greater 
material advantages than any war recorded in 
history has given to a nation. 



100 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

IV. 

If, on the one hand, the war has allowed 
Germany to make enormous gains up to the 
present time, on the other it has brought 
only heavy losses to the Allies, who found 
themselves suddenly forced to resist her 
attack. 

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
peace were concluded with Berlin on the basis 
of the "drawn game," which allows of no in- 
demnities. Each one of the Allies would have 
to bear, without any reduction, the immense 
expenses which have been incurred to maintain 
a war imposed on it by Germany. 

These expenses have been particularly heavy 
for exactly opposite reasons from those given 
above (see II.), which show how little, rela- 
tively, the war has cost Germany. Besides, 
the Allies are bound to take care of and to 
maintain millions of refugees from invaded 
regions, whereas the Germans have only tem- 
porarily borne such a burden and merely in a 
small part of eastern Prussia. After the war 
Belgium, Russia, and especially France will 
have to provide some tens of billions of francs' 
worth of extra charges for repairs of the enor- 
mous damages done by the Germans in invaded 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 101 

territories, to private persons. State proper- 
ties, railways, roads, etc. The Germans would 
not have a similar outlay, at least not in any- 
thing like the same proportion. In their con- 
ception of the *' drawn game" the Germans 
certainly reckon that these financial differ- 
ences would almost insure, after peace, the 
ultimate impotence of the allied countries with 
regard to Pangermany.^ 

What, for instance, would be the position of 
France if a war indemnity were not paid to 
her? A few familiar figures will enable us to 
form an opinion on that score. As I have 
said, in the first three years of the war France 
has spent about 100 billion francs. As soon as 
peace was concluded she would need at least 
30 billion to repair the enormous damages 
done to private individuals or to the State; 
and when the railways, roads, etc., had been 
put in good order again the total sum expended 
would probably be about 130 billions of francs. 
The national debt of France, which before the 
war amounted to 30 billion, would therefore 
be at least 160 billion. (This is not counting 
the fourth year of the war, which will cost at 
least 36 billion.) 

In 1914 the budget of France was, in round 
numbers, 5 billion francs. After the war, if 



102 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

only on account of the increased cost of living, 
this sum must be increased at least 10%; 
therefore the budget will have a first augmen- 
tation of 500 million. Besides, this same bud- 
get will have to carry the interest at 5% on 
the 130 billions of new debt contracted during 
the war, amounting to an annual payment of 
6 billion 500 million. The pensions to be paid 
to disabled men and to soldiers' widows would 
add at least 2 billion more. (These figures are 
probably far below what they would be ac- 
tually.) 

Therefore, the 5 -billion budget of 1914 would 
be almost trebled by the addition of 9 billion, 
making 14 billion in all. This formidable 
sum would not leave any funds available for 
carrying out important social reforms nor for 
the very considerable improvements which 
would be necessary in order to bring the eco- 
nomic equipment of France up to the standard 
necessary for an intensive revival of her eco- 
nomic life. 

How would it be possible in France to raise 
9 billions of francs each year by additional 
taxation after a struggle in which her people 
had been cruelly decimated, and when all her 
industrial machinery would need complete re- 
organization ? It is clear that the most crush- 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 103 

ing taxes levied on every person would not 
suffice to provide such a sum regularly. 

Such a situation must inevitably tend to 
create heavy financial difficulties for the State 
and for each individual Frenchman. The same 
would apply to economic undertakings. Thou- 
sands of share or bond holders would be in a 
most precarious condition, as securities would 
be immensely depreciated. Landed property, 
overburdened by taxes and seriously affected 
by the shortage of labor, would lose a great 
part of its value. 

This situation would lead to an enormous 
general rise in the cost of living, and to unend- 
ing difficulties which would make the life of 
every Frenchman well-nigh intolerable. 

Now, this financial situation, which is al- 
ready beginning to exist for the Russians, 
would also be the lot of the English and the 
Italians. As to Belgium, Roumania, and Ser- 
bia, it is easy to see that the formula "without 
indemnity," if adopted, would be enough to 
prevent entirely any reconstruction of those 
unfortunate countries. 

It is upon these immense financial distur- 
bances, which would be still further aggravated by 
the commercial competition of economic Panger- 
many {whose efficiency would grow with the 



104 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

growth of her organization) that the Germans are 
counting, their object being to reduce the Allies 
to economic slavery from which there will be no 
appeal, should peace be concluded on the basis of 
the "^ drawn game.'' 

Now, would it not be a monstrous iniquity 
that the people of France, England, Russia, 
and Italy should be condemned for tens of 
years to terrible poverty and to a condition of 
servitude like that which exists to-day in the 
occupied territory of France, Belgium, Serbia, 
etc., simply to gratify the execrable ambi- 
tion of the Hohenzollerns, and also, no matter 
what may be said to the contrary, that of the 
majority of the German people, who, because 
they have long been Pangermanists, wish to 
condemn the rest of Europe to slavery ? It is 
the plain truth that only a complete victory 
can save the alKed countries from absolute 
financial ruin, because Germany alone will be 
able to pay the costs of the struggle which she 
has precipitated. As she is responsible for 
the war she already owes to the united Al- 
lies a colossal sum, which may be estimated 
roundly at between 350 and 400 billions of 
francs. Even if the credit of the German 
Empire, as a State, is doomed to disappear on 
the day of her defeat, the material riches of 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 105 

Germany, which are very considerable, will 
still continue. Herr Helfferich himself valued 
them in 1914 at about 412 billions of francs. 

Of course Germany will only be able to pay 
her fabulous debt very gradually. But when 
means for collecting the German revenues shall 
have been systematically and attentively stud- 
ied by the victorious Allies, when these collec- 
tions of revenue shall have become assured (of 
course not by written German promises, worth- 
less scraps of paper, but by real guarantees in 
harmony with those precedents of history 
which the government of Berlin strongly con- 
tributed to establish in 1870), Germany will be 
perfectly able to hand to each of the great 
Allied victors about 2 billions of francs a 
year, while still keeping enough for her own 
subsistence. This annuity, thanks to modern 
financial combinations, will be sufficient to 
allow each Allied State to raise annual loans at 
relatively low rates and therefore easily pro- 
curable, and will permit each State to spare 
its citizens the burden of taxes which would be 
not only crushing but fatal and inevitable if it 
had to relinquish the hope of being recouped 
for its war expenses by Germany. 

Now this solution, which conforms to the 
most elementary justice, and which, I insist, is 



106 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

indispensable in order to avert the ruin of the 
AUied States, which have defended the civihza- 
tion of the world against German barbarism, 
would be rendered impossible by a peace through 
negotiation, concluded on the basis of the for- 
mula "peace without annexations and without 
indemnities," which, as can be proved, would 
practically allow Germany to keep the Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf and most of her profits 
from the war. 

V. 

The Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan, by its 
mere existence, involves results which cannot 
be escaped and which must be frankly con- 
sidered. 

1st. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Russia. 
It must be evident to every sane mind that if 
an economic and military Central Pangermany, 
dividing Europe into two parts, should be per- 
manently established, no really independent 
Russian federal republic could be formed. The 
results which German agitation has already 
obtained in Russia suffice to show that the 
steady threefold pressure — geographic, eco- 
nomic, and military — of Central Pangermany 
would, from force of circumstances, insure the 
final success of the Teutonic intrigues having 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 107 

for their object the disintegration of the vast 
Russian provinces, according to the plan of 
Lenine, into a series of republics, which con- 
stant anarchy would keep under the permanent 
influence of German agents. The practical 
outcome of this state of things from an eco- 
nomic point of view would be the preponder- 
ance of Germany's influence in the develop- 
ment of the immense n^atural riches of European 
and Asiatic Russia, and from a political stand- 
point its extension as far as the Pacific Ocean. 

German hegemony would thus be expanded, 
under forms more or less disguised, but never- 
theless effective (besides those of Central Pan- 
germany) over the 180 million inhabitants of 
the present Russia. Therefore 350 millions of 
human beings, more or less, occupying a vast 
territory containing inexhaustible mineral and 
alimentary riches, and geographically controlled 
by Central Pangermany, would be guided and 
inspired from Berlin. 

^nd. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Pan- 
Islamism. Maintenance of the Hamburg-Per- 
sian Gulf would allow the government of 
Berlin to set on foot a political and military 
Pan-Islamist movement which would help Ger- 
many to consolidate her victory by putting the 
Allied European Powers entirely at her mercy. 



108 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

since these hold among their possessions numer- 
ous Moslem subjects: France, particularly in 
Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco; Italy in Libya; 
Russia in the Crimea and in the Caucasus, in 
the region of Kazan, in Central Asia, and in 
Siberia; England in Egypt, in India, in Burma, 
in the Straits Settlements, and in the greater 
part of her African colonies. 

As Pan-Islamism is ostensibly founded on the 
restoration and wide extension of the influence 
and powers of the Sultan of Constantinople, 
Commander of the Faithful, it could not fail 
to flatter deeply the neo-nationalism of the 
Turks, which has manifested itself particularly 
since the failure of the Allies at the Darda- 
nelles. The result is that, thanks to Pan- 
Islamists, the Kaiser's interests are well served 
by the Sultan's Moslem subjects; a clever 
propaganda has dazzled their eyes with a pros- 
pect of the restoration of an empire even 
greater than in days of old. 

No doubt the Moslem insurrection has not 
become general, but the Islamic agitation has 
nevertheless yielded local results which will 
be better understood after the war, and which 
have hampered the Allies in India, in Egypt, 
in Libya, and in the French possessions of 
North Africa. 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 



109 




110 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

What Germany has already attempted to 
achieve with the help of Islam should serve 
the Allies as a severe warning of what she 
would certainly do in the future if the Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf should become a permanent 
reality. There are 18 millions of Moslems in 
Russia, who are more and more inclined to 
give ear to the suggestions of Berlin, trans- 
mitted by way of Constantinople. 

In Persia, in the Azerbaijan, there are about 
four hundred thousand men who would make 
very useful soldiers; in Afghanistan five hun- 
dred thousand first-class combatants would be 
found. Once armed they could be let loose in 
northern India, which contains about 50 mil- 
lion Moslems. These, so far, have collectively 
remained loyal to Great Britain, but their 
feelings might be subject to a change if Ger- 
many, by remaining mistress of the route from 
Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, appeared to be 
victorious. Hence we conclude that very soon 
after a peace leaving Germany this immense 
realization, the Pan-Islam movement would 
allow Berlin to complete the Pangerman plan of 
colonization in Africa and in Asia; especially in 
Russia, in India, and, as we shall see, in China. 

Srd. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and China. 
The German programme of universal domina- 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 111 

tion has already been extended in China as 
far as possible. In the first place, the 20 or 
30 millions of Moslems who inhabit the Celes- 
tial Empire have been wrought upon by Turco- 
German agents, coming by the way of Persia, 
Afghanistan, and the old "silk route." Be- 
sides, Berlin has employed every imaginable 
method in order to plunge China into the dis- 
orders which now prey upon her, the object of 
these tactics being to make the Chinese situa- 
tion so disturbing that in the first place it will 
absorb the attention of Japan and turn her 
thoughts from sending her troops into Europe 
(a question which has already come up, and 
may still be possible and desirable) ; and in the 
second that the state of affairs resulting from 
these disorders may make it possible, when 
once the war has been ended on the basis of 
the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, for Germany to 
carry out exactly the same political game in 
China that she has in Turkey. 

When that time comes Berlin will say to the 
Chinese, as she has already said to the Turks: 
"Your country is completely disorganized; 
your lives are no longer safe. Now we are bold 
financiers, enterprising manufacturers, ener- 
getic business men. We will help you to turn 
your country to account. We will procure for 



112 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

you the experts whom you need. We will give 
you the means of defending yourselves against 
your neighbors. We, who are the finest soldiers 
in the world, will bring up to a proper standard 
your endless and magnificent military forces, 
now in embryo. With your 300 millions of in- 
habitants you can be the absolute rulers of all 
Asia. We will, therefore, build up for you a 
formidable army and a very powerful navy." 

It is easy to perceive what is hidden behind 
this programme, with its obvious attraction 
for the Chinese. In reality, it is a preparation 
for the seizure by Germany of part of China, 
and her economic exploitation by Germany 
precisely in the same conditions and by the 
same proceedings as those which she has al- 
ready employed in Turkey with undeniable 
success. 

4!th. The Hamburg-Persian Gulf and Japan. 
The combination of the Pan-Islam movement 
in Asia, of the splitting up of Russia as far as 
the Pacific into republics more or less anarchis- 
tic and of a policy apparently favorable to 
China, are for Berlin powerful means of pre- 
paring the signal vengeance which Germany 
intends, after her victory, to inflict upon Japan 
in the future. No doubt in order to break the 
union of her adversaries Germany has already 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 113 

hinted to Tokio the idea of a separate peace, 
but that is merely a tactical move exacted by 
the need of the moment. Never would Pan- 
germany, mistress of the route from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf and exercising a predomi- 
nating influence in China and Siberia, forgive 
Japan for having driven her out of Kiao-Chau. 

Now if an immense Chinese army should be 
created and put under the direction of Ger- 
man oJBScers, Japan, in spite of the bravery of 
her soldiers, would at once be unable to avoid 
the consequences of the intolerable situation in 
which she would be placed through the relative 
smallness of her population (70 million, with 
her colonies) opposed to 300 million of Chinese. 

Japan is therefore directly aimed at by the 
scheme of domination from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf, which seriously endangers her 
future. Her interest in its destruction is 
therefore vital and she has every reason to 
make the greatest sacrifices in order to obtain 
this end. 

VI. 

We have noted (see IH.) that the profits 
which Germany has already made in the war, 
or has insured to herself for the future if the 
present conditions are allowed to continue with- 



114 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

out essential change, certainly represent hun- 
dreds of billions of francs and come from seven 
principal sources, which are: 

1st. The booty amassed from three hun- 
dred thousand square kilometres of invaded 
territory. 

2nd. The value of the Pangerman mort- 
gages. 

3rd. The value of the monopoly of exploita- 
tion in the Balkans and Turkey. 

4th. The value of economic Pangermany. 

5th. The value of military Pangermany. 

6th. The value of the economic profits 
which the existence of Pangermany gives to 
Germany at the expense of Russia. 

7th. The confiscation of French loans, to 
the extent of at least 21 billions, either in Rus- 
sia or in the States which constitute Central 
Pangermany. 

It is important to notice that only the first of 
these sources of profit, that is to say, the booty 
which Germany has won by her invasion of 
enemy territory, can properly be classed as due 
to the war; the other six are entirely due to the 
creation of Central Pangermany, and do not 
come directly from the war, but from the gigantic 
and not yet understood swindle which the struggle 
has enabled Berlin to work at the expense of her 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 115 

own allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Tur- 
key, because Serbia has been crushed. The oc- 
cupation of Serbia is the only positive hnk 
which unites the six last sources of profit with 
the first one, but this occupation of Serbia by 
Germany, or, to speak more accurately, by her 
vassals, is of vital importance to Berlin's plans, 
for unless Serbia is held, Pangermany must 
crumble. 

As a matter of fact, geographically speaking, 
Serbia was a water-tight bulkhead which Ger- 
many, already in control of the Austro-Hunga- 
rian leaders, was absolutely forced to break 
down in order to establish her paramount 
influence in Bulgaria and Turkey. Besides, 
Serbia is indispensable to the working of the 
railway from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, as 
the Belgrade-Nish-Pirot branch, which runs 
through Serbia, is an essential part of it. One 
of Germany's alHes, Count Karolyi, acknowl- 
edged in the Hungarian chamber of deputies 
that Germany had made the war for the sake 
of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf.* 

If it were necessary Germany could easily 
afford to give up her first source of profit, that 
accruing to her from her invasion of five 
hundred thousand square kilometres of enemy 

*jLe Journal de Geneve, December 30th, 1916. 



116 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

country, provided she could keep the six other 
sources which are insured to her by the pos- 
session of Central Pangermany, always provided 
she retained Serbia (about eighty-seven thou- 
sand square kilometres), as that Serbian terri- 
tory means the Pangerman bridge or nexus 
which is indispensable to the working of the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan. In the minds of 
the Germans "Peace without annexations or 
indemnities" is most certainly not meant to 
apply to Serbia. There have been very clear 
statements in this regard, evidently made with 
the consent of the German censorship. The 
Kreuzzeitung declared: "Mr. Lloyd George 
has said that the restoration of Serbia is an 
essential condition of peace, and that English 
honor is involved therein. The objects of the 
war for which England is fighting, on the one 
hand, and Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, on 
the other, are therefore absolutely contradictory/^ 
The Hamburger Fremdenblatt added: ''Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia. 
It is for them alone to decide what shall be done 
with the former kingdom of King Peter." '\ The 
Volksrecht of Zurich announced on August 
30th, 1917, that a new map of Central Europe 

* Le Matin, August 14th, 1917. 
tie Journal, August 18th, 1917. 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 117 

had been published in Vienna, showing the 
annexation of western Serbia by Austria, which 
agrees with the warning of the Neue Preus- 
sische Zeitung: "We may be assured that 
Germany will only make peace according to 
the war map." * 

Let us suppose that, taking advantage of the 
weariness of the AlHes, Germany or her vassals 
should declare themselves willing to make 
peace by negotiation, and to guarantee the 
independence of Serbia. Such a declaration 
would not change actual conditions. The 
kingdom of Serbia might exist legally, to be 
sure, on paper, but the principle of '''no indem- 
nity*' would leave her in her present state of 
utter ruin, which is irremediable unless there 
should be complete reparation. Is it possible 
that if Austro-Germany shall say some day, 
"All right, I'll give up my claim to Serbia," 
that the Allies should be taken in by any 
such grim jest ? Besides, what assurance could 
they have that this promise of evacuation 
would be carried out at the same time by Ger- 
many, Austria, and Bulgaria, in whose gov- 
ernments it is impossible to have the least 
confidence ? 

Therefore a peace said to be "by negotia- 

* Le Journal, August 30th, 1917. 



118 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

tion," drawn up on pamper, without real guar- 
antees, might perfectly well respect the fron- 
tiers of 1914 on paper, and might also respect, 
on paper, the formula "without annexations"; 
but in fact Germany would be left mistress of 
Pangermany, and would consequently profit in 
the future by the six sources of enormous profit 
which she has gained by the war. We may 
observe that Germany's evacuation of the ter- 
ritory invaded by her in the west and in the 
east (which we have supposed for the develop- 
ment of our hypothesis) would be only tempo- 
rary. It would be ignoring completely the 
tenacity and ambition of the HohenzoUerns to 
imagine that Germany, once mistress of an 
empire from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, 
would sincerely renounce the ambition of dom- 
inating the North Sea and the English Chan- 
nel. Hence the evacuation of Belgium and 
the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine, which on 
our hypothesis Germany would have yielded 
to France, would only be for a short time. 

If economic and military Pangermany is 
allowed to exist, the fulfilment of Pangerman 
plans in the west and in the east would be an 
inevitable and fatal consequence. Indeed, the 
commercial competition of economic Panger- 
many would in itself irremediably ruin eco- 



THE "DRAWN GAME" 119 

nomic France, England, and Russia, who, hav- 
ing no compensation, would sink under the 
burden of their colossal war expenses, while to 
Germany the struggle would have brought 
gains far exceeding her losses, thanks to her 
having kept six out of the seven sources of 
profit won through the war. What could the 
Allied countries of to-day do if, while they were 
still exhausted by a disastrous peace, Germany, 
drawing on the 30 millions of soldiers that 
Pangermany would put under her orders, 
should proceed, after a short respite, to seize 
again, both in the west and east, what she had 
by our hypothesis) temporarily renounced ? 

It may then be definitely stated that the for- 
mula "Peace without annexations or indemni- 
ties" is mendacious in the highest degree, and 
only a screen for the most formidable of Ber- 
lin's snares. If the German people seemed to 
approve this formula it was because its apphca- 
tion would leave the AlHes to bear the unprece- 
dented expenses of the war, while it would in- 
sure to Germany the enormous profits resulting 
from the maintenance of Central Pangermany 
and the Hamburg-Persian Gulf, with great and 
manifold consequences which would enable her, 
after a brief pause, to achieve her plan of uni- 
versal domination. 



120 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

VII. 

It is thus clearly proved that the consolida- 
tion of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf is a for- 
midable danger, both to the Allies and to the 
freedom of the world. The economic and mili- 
tary power which it would give Germany would 
be so intolerable that those who are fighting 
for the purpose of putting an end to great ar- 
maments would find themselves once more 
plunged into the vortex of the most rigid mili- 
tarism, for they could not contend with Panger- 
many except at the cost of tremendous arma- 
ments, which would absorb all their resources 
and all their attention. Now, would they be 
in a position to undertake such armaments in 
the infinitely difficult financial situation in 
which, according to our hypothesis, they would 
stand .^ Would they even have the resolution 
to undertake them, after the frightful moral 
disappointment of their peoples, who would 
learn too late the enormous mistake committed 
by their governments in negotiating for peace 
on the basis of the so-called "drawn game," 
which had allowed Berlin to consolidate her 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan? Besides, even 
if the Allies were willing to attempt once more 
the overthrow of the atrocious Prussian mili- 



THE " DRAWN GAME " 121 

tarism, now much more oppressive than before 
the war, Pangermany would certainly not leave 
them time to prepare. If the Allies were dis- 
posed to renew the conflict they would, in their 
assumed financial and moral situation, cer- 
tainly be reduced to impotence before they 
could get ready to hold their own against the 
new German colossus. 

It is therefore incontestable that France, 
England, Russia, Italy, the United States, and 
Japan have a common and absolutely vital 
interest in this war, far greater than any pri- 
vate interest of their own, which should make 
them stand firmly, shoulder to shoulder, until 
the end, in order that the Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf plan, or, in other words, that odious in- 
strument of oppression, Pangermany, shall be 
destroyed under conditions which will make 
its re-establishment impossible forever. 



CHAPTER VII. 

HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY. 

I. Why Austria-Hungary is the crucial point of the uni- 
versal problem presented by the Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf plan. 

n. The thesis of the preservation of Austria-Hungary. 

HI. The application of the principle of nationalities to 
Central Europe. 

IV. A strong barrier of anti-Pangerman nations can be 
established in Central Europe, and there only. 

I. 

In order to understand how to destroy Pan- 
germany, which is the prime necessity of any 
decisive victory on the part of the AHies, and 
without which there can be no just or lasting 
peace, we must study the war as it stretches 
over Europe, and see what objective, whether 
geographical, military, or political, is common 
to all the Allies, the attainment of which would 
at the same time frustrate the Hamburg-Per- 
sian Gulf plan (and therefore Central Panger- 
many), deal Prussian militarism a mortal blow, 
and also guarantee permanent attainment of 
the legitimate personal objectives which each 
of the Allies has in view as they carry on col- 

122 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 123 




124 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

lectively the formidable war which was forced 
upon them. 

Now, this common objective, this crucial 
point of all the problems, whether geographical, 
military, or political, which the Allies must 
solve is represented by Austria-Hungary, be- 
cause: 

1. That State is only the enemy of the 
Allies through the Hapsburg dynasty, which, 
yielding to the injunctions of Berlin, has be- 
trayed its own peoples. In fact, Francis Jo- 
seph declared war without even daring to con- 
sult his Parliament, for he knew very well that 
three-fourths of his subjects, sympathizing 
with Russia, France, and England, and being 
definitely hostile to Germany, would have op- 
posed, by the voice of their representatives, 
any bloody struggle destined to turn to 
the advantage of Germanism. The Emperor 
Charles I. cannot to-day (for irresistible rea- 
sons, financial and military, which make Aus- 
tria-Hungary the vassal of Germany) conclude 
peace without the consent of Berlin. 

2. It is manifest that Germany cannot 
maintain a war against Europe without the 
help of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers whom 
she has dexterously contrived to enlist in her 
cause, the vast majority of whom only fight 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 125 

because they are forced to do so by the brutal 
German staff-officers who command them. 

3. It is clear that after the peace, if Ger- 
many were to evacuate all the territories she 
now occupies in the east and the west, to 
restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, and yet to 
keep her hold, more or less disguised, on Aus- 
tria-Hungary, she would possess all the means 
for retaking, after a short delay, Alsace-Lor- 
raine from France, since the German hold on 
Austria-Hungary inevitably implies the accom- 
plishment of the scheme ^'from Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulfy* which practically puts at the 
disposal of Germany 30 millions of soldiers, 
who would represent a formidable power be- 
cause of their standardized organization under 
the direction of the Berlin General Staff. 

4. From this last consideration it follows 
that if after the peace Germany were to retain 
her disguised hold on Austria-Hungary, the 
solemn promise given by France, England, and 
Russia to re-establish Serbia in its indepen- 
dence and its integrity would be practically in- 
capable of fulfilment. 

5. It is clear that the new Russia could 
not be really independent if the seizure of Aus- 
tria-Hungary by Germany were maintained. 
Besides, on account of the wide extension of 



126 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Prussian militarism resulting therefrom, the 
United States and England would be con- 
strained to keep up the great armaments which 
they have only adopted temporarily. Belgium 
would still be imperilled, for the same reason 
that Alsace-Lorraine would be, even if given 
back to France for a short time. As for Italy, 
the German hegemony over Central Europe 
would mean the end of all her national hopes 
for the freedom of the Adriatic and for Italian 
expansion on the eastern shores of the Medi- 
terranean. For Serbia and Montenegro this 
continued seizure would be a death sentence 
from which there would be no appeal. 

6. On the other hand, if freedom from Ger- 
man control were assured to the non-German 
peoples of Austria-Hungary after the peace, it 
would absolutely prevent any aggressive re- 
vival of Prussian militarism in the future, for 
the very effect of that independence would be 
to take from the General Staff of Berlin troops 
which are indispensable to the realization of 
the Pangerman plan. This is shown incontro- 
vertibly by the fact that if it were not for the 
forces which she draws from Austria-Hungary 
and Turkey, Germany would not be able to 
continue the war. 

7. A glance at the map on p. 38 will show 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 127 

that, because of their geographical situation, this 
independence of the non-German peoples of 
Austria-Hungary in regard to Germany is the 
only thing which will enable the Allies to keep 
their promises toward Serbia and Roumania, 
and also (by definitely breaking the main axis 
of the Pangerman scheme, beginning with Bo- 
hemia) to eliminate the immense peril of the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan. Every ally, with- 
out any exception, is most vitally interested in 
preventing its consolidation. 

II. 

The liberation of the oppressed Slav and 
Latin inhabitants of Austria-Hungary would 
mean the dismemberment of the Hapsburg 
Monarchy, and would. go against the classic 
formula: ''// Austria did not exist it would be 
necessary to invent her." There was for a long 
time some reason for this idea, but it has lost 
its value since the complete seizure by the 
HohenzoUerns of all the motive power of Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and consequently of the Haps- 
burg dynasty, which is intertwined with the 
constitution of the Austro-Hungarian State. 
To wish to preserve that State would be to 
play the German game, for it is practically im- 



128 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

possible to separate the Hapsburgs from the 
HohenzoUerns. It would establish the Ger- 
manic yoke on the Slav and Latin subjects of 
the Hapsburgs, thus facilitating the accom- 
plishment of the plan "from Hamburg to the 
Persian GuK." More than that, the house of 
Hapsburg has given such ample proofs of its 
incapacity, its duplicity, and its readiness to 
follow even the most criminal suggestions of 
Berlin that its maintenance at the head of the 
Austro-Hungarian peoples should not be re- 
garded seriously. 

I must add — and I insist strongly upon this 
point — that this is not only my personal opin- 
ion, but also that of those men — ^few in num- 
ber but of keen insight — ^who, for the last 
twenty years and upon the spot, have made a 
special study of the Central European problem. 
Among them may be particularly mentioned 
MM. Louis Leger, professor at the College de 
France; E. Denis and Haumant, professors at 
the Sorbonne; A. Gauvain, of the Journal des 
Debats, and among Englishmen, Sir Arthur 
Evans, Seton- Watson, and Wickham Steed, 
foreign political editor of the London Times, 
who for ten years was the correspondent of 
that powerful organ at Vienna. 

Now, all these experts say as I do that it is 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 129 

absolutely necessary to 'put the house of Hapsburg 
— the vassal of the Hohenzollerns — out of com- 
mission. The opinion of these experts is of 
pecuhar importance, as they were in a position 
to study the Austro-Hungarian question under 
conditions infinitely better than those which 
fall to the lot of professional diplomatists. 

An essential point remains to be proved, for 
it gives rise to peculiar anxiety in the minds of 
that part of the public in the Allied countries 
which still harps on the false idea that Austria- 
Hungary is a specially German country. This 
section of the public doubts whether the appli- 
cation of the principle of nationalities, which 
the Allies demand, would not have the effect 
of necessarily and considerably increasing Ger- 
many by incorporating in it the Germans of 
the Hapsburg Empire. 

It is therefore necessary to demonstrate by 
means of figures and accurate geographical and 
ethnographical arguments that this fear is quite 
chimerical. 

III. 

On the whole. President Wilson, in common 
with the Allies, desires the reconstruction of 
Europe according to the principle of nationali- 



130 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

ties, a principle which is not founded on race 
and language, as is too generally believed, but 
upon readiness to live together. 

A proof that the principle of nationalities 
should be so interpreted is furnished by the 
Swiss, where populations of different races 
(Germanic and Latin) and of different lan- 
guages (French, German, and Italian) yet form 
a clearly distinct nationality. 

The strongly expressed desire of a group of 
the population to live in common is moreover 
indispensable before they should have the right 
to form a separate State. For instance, in 
France the Basques and Bretons, who have 
kept their own peculiar languages, still con- 
tinue to form part of France. The principle of 
nationalities is therefore based upon the demo- 
cratic idea of personal liberty, a conception 
which spread from France throughout the 
earth in 1789. 

As nothing in this world is absolute, it is 
clear that the principle of nationalities cannot 
always receive in practice a complete applica- 
tion. In order to constitute States with a po- 
tentiality of life, we must take into account 
not only the nationalities but also the stra- 
tegical, defensive, and economical needs of the 
majority. There are, besides, countries like 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 131 

Macedonia and certain regions of Austria- 
Hungary where nationalities are so intermin- 
gled that the application of the principle of 
nationality can only be relative. It also hap- 
pens that a minority of the population may 
have to be sacrificed to the good of the ma- 
jority, even though this minority may be quite 
alive to its rights. Finally, there are excep- 
tional cases where this principle must give way 
in the general interests of European peace. 
Thus, in the Europe of the future, certain 
strategic regions from which an aggressive is 
especially possible, should be put out of reach 
of those Powers to which war is "the national 
industry." 

Having given these explanations, and made 
these reservations, let us see what would be 
obtained in the main by the application of the 
principle of nationalities to the German Em- 
pire. In virtue of this principle the Germans 
ought to restore liberty to those peoples who 
are included by force within their boundaries, 
that is to say about: 

Inhabitants 

Poles. 5,000,000 

Inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine 1,500,000 

Danes 200,000 

Total 6,700,000 



132 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

The Germany of to-day, which numbered 
68 miUions of inhabitants in 1914, including 
the non-Germans, would be brought down to 
about 61,300,000; in round figures, 61 millions 
of genuine Germans. 

But the logical application of the principle 
of nationalities would give to Germany the 
power of absorbing those Germans of the 
Hapsburg monarchy who on historical, strateg- 
ical, and geographical grounds could be legiti- 
mately added to Germany after its reduction 
from 68 to 61 millions of inhabitants. What 
would be the result? 

Let us look at the map on p. 35, which 
shows the ethnographic situation of Austria- 
Hungary. 

This map only gives a very imperfect idea 
of the ethnographic facts, because it is drawn 
from documents which are German and Mag- 
yar, and purposely falsified. In reality the 
Slav regions are a good deal more extensive 
than is indicated by the shaded zones. 

The following, however, are the results given 
for the whole of the Hapsburg Monarchy by 
the ofiicial Germano-Magyar statistics in the 
census of 1910: 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 133 

Austria. 

Round figures in 
tens of thousands 

Germans 9,950,000 

Czechs 6,440,000 

Poles 4,970,000 

Ruthenians 3,520,000 

Slovenes 1,260,000 

Serbo-Croatians 790,000 

Italians 770,000 

Roumanians 280,000 

Total V>. 27,980,000 

HUNGABY. 

Magyars 10,050,000 

Roumanians 2,950,000 

Serbo-Croatians 2,940,000 

Germans 2,040,000 

Slovaks 1,970,000 

Ruthenians 480,000 

Total 20,430,000 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

Serbo-Croatians (orthodox, or Moslems of 

Serbian origin) 2,000,000 

According to these figures, there are 12 mil- 
lions of Germans in the Hapsburg Empire, but 
we shall see that not nearly all of these 12 mil- 
lions could be united to Germany. In fact: 

1. As the table shows, rather more than 
two millions of Germans are in Hungary, where 
they are scattered in small groups among the 



134 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

other nationalities. They could not therefore 
be united to Germany. 

2. Out of the 10 millions, roughly speaking, 
of Germans in Austria, if we deduct those who 
are intermixed with the Czechs and discount 
the garbling of Vienna statistics, we may allow 
that the true number of those who could 
be geographically incorporated in Germany 
amounts to not more than seven or eight mil- 
lions. Let us take this last figure. If these 
eight millions were incorporated in Germany, 
then Germany of to-day, reduced for the rea- 
sons indicated on pages 131, 132, to 61 millions, 
would be enlarged, at the expense of Austria, 
by eight millions of inhabitants. She would 
then have a total of 69 millions of inhabitants. 

Therefore, as the present German Empire 
had in 1914 a population of 68 millions of in- 
habitants, we see that the application of the 
principle of nationalities would allow Ger- 
many to gain on the southwest just about the 
equivalent of what the same principle would 
take from her on the circumference of the ex- 
isting Empire. 

It is by no means certain that the Germans 
of Austria would wish to join themselves to 
the Germans of Germany, but let us suppose it. 

Would a Germany of 69 or 70 millions of 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 135 

genuine Germans be really dangerous for 
Europe? I do not think so, for, as we shall 
see, the application of the principle of nation- 
alities would have the effect of withdrawing 
totally from the influence of Berlin's Panger- 
manism all the rest of the inhabitants of Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

In fact, if out of the 50 millions of inhabi- 
tants in Austria-Hungary of to-day about 8 
millions joined Germany, 42 millions of Aus- 
tro-Hungarian subjects would remain. Of this 
number: 

Five millions of Poles would join Poland; 

Four millions of Ruthenians would join Lit- 
tle Russia; 

Three millions of Roumanians would join 
Roumania; 

One million of Italians would join Italy; 

Making a total of 13 millions of inhabitants. 

There would therefore remain a compact 
group, composed of 29 millions of inhabitants, 
made up of Czech-Slovaks, Magyars, and Ger- 
mans, these last diluted in the solid mass of 
Magyars and Serbo-Croatians, or Yugo-Slavs. 
As these last wish to unite with the five mil- 
lion Serbians of Serbia, we thus deduce the 
presence in Central Europe of a mass of 34 
million inhabitants, containing an infinitesi- 



136 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

mal proportion of Germans, and so situated 
geographically that they could perfectly well 
form united States, in which the rights of each 
nationality and the form of government of 
each State would be respected, and which, 
nevertheless, would constitute an economic 
territory extensive enough to correspond to 
modern needs. 

The obstacle to the creation of such united 
States might seem to be the reluctance of the 
Magyars (who at present are playing the Ger- 
man game) to come to an understanding with 
the neighboring nationalities. This will dis- 
appear when the day comes which will make 
the real Magyar race, now oppressed by a 
feudal nobility, master of its own fate. It 
will not then be afraid to consider the possible 
creation of united States. 

In short, we may conclude that there is in 
Austria-Hungary and in Serbia a mass of 34 
millions of inhabitants, who are practically 
free from Germanic elements and could form 
in Central Europe a confederacy of States that 
might in time develop into the United States 
of Europe. 



HOW TO DESTROY PANGERMANY 137 

IV. 

The territory of Austria-Hungary therefore 
contains all the ethnographic elements which 
would allow of the establishment of new States, 
constituted on just and durable foundations, 
and under such conditions that they would 
form for the future an insurmountable barrier 
to Pangermanism. It is there, on the road 
from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, in Central 
Europe, that the solution will be found for the 
formidable problem set to the world by the 
temporary creation of Pangermany. We may 
be absolutely certain that this indispensable solu- 
tion can be found there, and nowhere else. In- 
deed, even without counting her enormous 
losses of population, Serbia, with her five mil- 
lion inhabitants, could evidently not form a 
sufficiently effective barrier to Pangermanism, 
if Austria, still combined with Germany, made 
a block of 118 milhons of inhabitants, all of 
whose military strength would be entirely at 
the service of Berlin. 

The anti-Pangerman barrier necessary to the 
freedom of the world can nowhere be organized 
with such powerful forces as on the territory of 
what is now Austria-Hungary. 

We may be definitely assured that, in order 



138 UNITED STATES AND PANGEEMANIA 

to break up the scheme of "from Hamburg to 
the Persian Gulf," and therefore practically 
Central Pangermany, it will be sufficient, but 
absolutely necessary, that the Slav and Latin 
peoples of Austria-Hungary shall be definitely 
freed from the yoke which Berlin has been 
able to impose on them because of the war. 
The natural consequence of that freedom will 
be the almost automatic formation of the three 
barriers of anti-Pangerman nations of which 
an idea is given by the map on p. 38. 

From the foregoing reflections we may conclude 
that the Austro-Hungarian question is assuredly 
the crucial point of the problem, not only Euro- 
pean but universal, set before all the civilized 
States by the creation of Pangermany, which is 
now an accomplished fact. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT. 

I. The moral principles of the American people make 
it their duty to take part in the war. 
II. The political interests of the United States oblige 
them to contribute toward a decisive victory for 
the Allies. 
III. The United States and the Austro-Hungarian ques- 
tion. 

I. 

The moral obligation of Americans to take 
part in the war is shown by the Map of the 
Martyrs. (See map on p. 141.) Not only does 
Germany constantly violate the laws of war 
between belligerents, but also and above all 
the German authorities subject all the civil 
anti-Germanic populations of the territories 
now under the Pangerman occupation, from 
the North Sea to Bagdad, to a frightful reign of 
terror. The sufferings inflicted by the Ger- 
mans on the French, the Belgians, the Slavs 
and ItaHans of Austria-Hungary, the Rou- 
manians, the Greeks, and most of all on the 
Serbians and Armenians (whom they have 
caused to be massacred wholesale and sys- 
tematically by the Turks), represent millions 

139 



140 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

of unspeakable sorrows, of odious crimes, of 
cruel martyrdoms. It is clear that the hu- 
mane principles of Americans cannot allow 
such prodigious crimes to go unpunished, for 
that would be to allow of their being repeated 
and extended to still other countries. 

These unheard-of crimes are the result of 
German imperialism, added to the imperial- 
ism of Austria, the feudal imperialism of the 
Magyars, the Balkanic imperialism of the Bul- 
garians, together with the neo-imperialism of 
the Turks, which is based on Pan-Islamism. 
Now, all these imperialisms have as their foun- 
dation the ties which unite, on a basis of Prus- 
sian militarism, the autocrats of Vienna and 
Berlin, whose principles are radically opposed 
_to those of the Allies. 

From a moral point of view this frightful 
war is essentially one of autocracy against 
democracy, of the feudal spirit against the 
spirit of the modern world. This being the 
case, and as the victory of democracy was 
still in suspense on account of various mis- 
takes, technical, diplomatic, and military, on 
the part of the European Allies, the United 
States, by reason of their principles, could 
not expose universal freedom to so serious a 
risk by refusing to enter the war. 



THE U. S. AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT 141 




142 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

II. 

The political interests of the United States 
are deeply involved in the struggle, for four 
principal reasons: 

1st. The danger of German intrigues in 
America. 

Citizens of the United States can no longer 
ignore the ambition of Pangermany toward 
America, especially in the South American 
countries, more^ especially Argentina and 
Brazil, which are destined, according to the 
Pangerman plan, to become German pro- 
tectorates. The manifold and incessant in- 
trigues of German agents during the war, 
throughout the length and breadth of both 
North and South America, and particularly 
in Mexico, where the German plot against the 
United States was unmasked in the most star- 
tling manner, give positive proof of the real- 
ity of the Pangerman programme concerning 
America. It is, therefore, a danger which 
Americans can only avert by striking at the 
root of the evil, that is to say, by helping to 
destroy the basis of Pangermanism, which is 
Prussian militarism. 

2nd. The intolerable secret German organiza- 
tion in the United States. 



THE U. S. AND THE PANGERMAN PLOT 143 

After having established their fundamental 
plan of 1895, the Germans set themselves the 
task of making a register of all the German 
elements, throughout the universe, which 




might be capable of helping them to carry out 
their plan. 

The map on this page is drawn up In ac- 
cordance with the data of map 5 In the Pan- 
german Atlas of Paul Langhans, which gives 
the result of the register. The map shows 



144 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

what propoHion the Germans born in Germany 
who had emigrated to the United States bore to 
the American population about the year 1890. 
We can see that the proportion was consid- 
erable, since at some points (see the map) it 
amounted to 35 per cent. Further, the gen- 
eral view presented by the map enables us to 
observe that in the United States the Ger- 
mans have planted themselves by preference 
in the industrial and commercial regions of 
the East and of the Great Lakes. We can 
therefore understand what followed. Ever 
since 1900 the Alldeutscher Verband, or Pan- 
german League, in obedience to secret instruc- 
tions from the official authorities in Berlin, 
has laid itself out to select from this mass of 
Germans in the United States all such as might 
best serve the cause of Prussian militarism at 
any given moment and at any place, as soon 
as the European conflagration should break 
out. Hence, for the last twenty years most 
of the 10 to 15 million Americans of German 
birth have been organized. Little by little, 
in the bosom of the United States there has 
grown up a veritable State within a State, 
endowed with the most powerful means of 
influence. In point of fact, among the Ger- 
man-Americans there are manufacturers, mer- 



THE PANGERMAN PLOT 145 

chants, and bankers of colossal fortunes, who 
control the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
workmen or employees living in dependence 
upon them. As the German-Americans also 
own many newspapers and have numerous 
associations, they are able to exert a consider- 
able influence on the policy of the United 
States, and even to secure the election to Con- 
gress of men on whom they can count. The 
Delbriick law has completed the German 
organization in the United States, by enabling 
an influential party of German-Americans to 
preserve the appearance of American citizens, 
while at the same time they remain pledged 
heart and soul to forward the Kaiser's scheme 
of universal slavery. 

A multitude of striking facts — apolitical 
pressure, monster strikes, plots and outrages 
planned and carried out by order of the 
Kaiser's agents, such as Von Papen, Boy-Ed, 
Von Igel, etc. — have abundantly shown that 
the German organization in America threatens 
the independence of the United States, and is 
of a definitely treasonable character. There 
is only one way for America to rid herself of 
this criminal and parasitic organization which 
the Germans have been able to foster on her 
soil, and to prevent it from any future growth, 



146 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

and that is, to make victory certain for the 
Allies. 

3rd. Berlin^ s plan for dealing with the United 
States, 

In 1898, before Manila, the German Rear- 
Admiral von Goetzen, a friend of the Kaiser, 
said to Admiral Dewey: "In about fifteen 
years my country will begin a great war. . . . 
Some months after we have done our job in 
Europe we shall take New York, and probably 
Washington, and we shall keep them for a 
time. We do not intend to take any territory 
from you, but only to put your country in its 
proper place with reference to Germany. We 
shall extract one or two billions of dollars from 
New York and other towns."* At the time 
these words were regarded as mere bluster, 
but they were connected, nevertheless, with the 
plan of universal domination which was even 
then being worked out at Berlin. Besides, a 
phrase in a letter from Baron von Meysenburg, 
the German Consul at New Orleans, written 
on December 4th, 1915, to Von Papen, the 
German military attache at Washington who 
organized the principal outrages in the United 
States — which letter by the way was seized 

* The Naval and Military Record, quoted by L'Echo de Paris, Sep- 
tember 24th, 1915. 



THE PANGERMAN PLOT 147 

by the English — proved that in the minds of 
Germans behind the scenes the turn of the 
United States would come after that of the 
European Allies. The phrase ran: ''May the 
day of the settling of accounts come here also, 
and when that does come may our govern- 
ment have found again that will of iron with- 
out which no impression can be made on this 
country."* 

Finally, William II. himself said to Mr. 
Gerard, the American Ambassador to Ger- 
many: *'I shall stand no nonsense from 
America after the war."f These words from 
the head of the Hohenzollerns leave no pos- 
sible doubt that the independence of the 
United States is directly endangered by the 
extension of Prussianism. 

4th. The creation of Pangermany. 

Let us consider, as a hypothesis, that the 
Allies are defeated in Europe. Any one with 
common sense can see that Germany, with 
the formidable means at her command, could 
impose her economic law on South America, 
would make herself mistress of Canada, and 
practically dominate the United States, where 
the German-Americans would help Berlin to 

* Le Temps, January 17th, 1917. 
t Le Temps, August 14th, 1917. 



148 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

carry out the German plan. The freedom of 
the United States is therefore strictly in- 
compatible with the economic and military 
existence of Central Pangermany, since the 
perfection of that organization would give Ger- 
many the means of universal domination, and 
therefore enable her to intervene effectively in 
the affairs of the United States. 

As a result of the new order of things for 
which Germany is responsible, Pangermany 
actually represents the present and future danger 
of the United States. It follows, therefore, that 
even if the United States do not wish to de- 
stroy the Germans as a nation, they should 
most energetically desire the destruction of the 
Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme and the crushing 
of that instrument for world-wide oppression. 
Central Pangermany. That objective is the es- 
sential and vital reason why the policy of the 
United States should be to push the war with 
the utmost vigor, in order to insure a decisive 
victory for the Allies. 

If, on the one hand, the United States felt 
it their duty to enter the war that they might 
help to put an end to German barbarity and 
insure the triumph of democracy over des- 
potism, on the other they should now feel that 
they have a direct personal interest therein. 



THE PANGERMAN PLOT 149 

because any sacrifices, no matter how great 
they may be, are infinitely less than those 
which they would be obliged to make later, 
if, from failure to realize the designs of Ger- 
many on America, they should allow her to 
Pangermanize Europe. 

III. 

The Interest of the United States. 

The personal interest of the United States in 
the European war consists in the necessity for 
doing away with Pangermany. As its destruc- 
tion can only come from a complete reorganiza- 
tion of Central Europe, it follows that the United 
States has a direct and first-hand interest in also 
solving the question of Austria-Hungary on the 
basis of the principle of nationalities, that solu- 
tion being absolutely indispensable if the world 
is to see the end of the Pangerman peril, and of 
great armaments. 



CONCLUSIONS. 

If in this war the AUies are to obtain the 
decisive victory which is absolutely indis- 
pensable, they must keep three things con- 
stantly in mind. 

I. 

Germany^s responsibility for bringing on the 
war is inexcusable and crushing, since its 'pre- 
meditation by the Prussian Government ante- 
dates the outbreak of hostilities by at least twenty- 
one years. 

In the Allied countries the responsibility of 
the Central Powers for the conflict is usually 
placed by reference to the diplomatic docu- 
ments which were exchanged in the weeks 
immediately preceding it. This process, how- 
ever, is inadequate, as it only deals with a 
very short time, and gives Germany an op- 
portunity to wrangle over dates, and even 
over the hours at which telegrams were sent. 

In order that the exact and formidable truth 
should be known, public opinion among the 
Allies must be convinced that the Prussian 

150 



CONCLUSIONS 151 

Government has steadily worked out the Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf plan ever since 1893, that 
is to say, for twenty-one years before the war 
began. 

German covetousness of Turkey goes back 
a long way. In 1866 Doctor Spenger wrote 
in a pamphlet about Babylonia: "The East 
is the only country on earth which has not 
been monopolized by one or other of the great 
Powers, and yet it offers the finest field for 
colonization. If Germany does not let the chance 
slip, and will seize it before the Cossacks can 
get hold of it, she will have won the best share of 
what still remains to be divided in the world.' ^ * 
This policy had been advocated by many 
learned authorities in Germany, but it was 
William II., soon after he came to the throne 
in 1888, who first thought seriously of laying 
hands on Turkey. The oldest proof of prac- 
tical preparation for this attempt which I 
have been able to unearth dates back to 1893, 
but very likely still older ones will come to 
light when the war is over. 

In 1897 a book was brought out in Berlin 
of which the title-page is here reproduced in 
facsimile : 

* Deutschlands Anspriiche an das turkische Erbe, p. 12. Lehmann, 
Munich, 1896. 



152 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

KLEINASIENS NATURSCHlTZE 

SEINE WICHTIGSTEN 

TIERE. KOLTDRPFLANZEN DND MINERALSCHATZE 

VOM WIHTSCHAFTLICHEN UNO KULTURGESCHICHTLICHEH 8TAN0PUNKT 



KARL KANNENBERG 

rncM.-ucuT. m Taonms. reLsiRtiLURie-itEoiMcnT Rr. i» 



MIT BEITBiGEN 

VON 

PREM.- LIEUT SCHAFFER 

rouukdieut zuu anossBN oeNeniLSTii 

UND 

ABBILDONOEN NaCH aUPN&HHEN VON HFTM. ANTOR (F'EU)ART.-IlEOT. Nr. 11)) 

HPTM. t. PBITTWITZ UND GAFFROU {INFANT- REOT. Nr. 9S) UND PBEM..tlfiOT* 

SCRAFFEB UNO KAVKEIIBEBe. 



lOT XXXI VOLLBILDERN CND D PtlMEIt 



BERLIN 

VERLAG voir GEBRUDER BOBNTBAEGE& 

1897. 



CONCLUSIONS 153 

The title of this work is: ''The native riches 
of Asia Minor; her most important wealth in 
live stock, minerals, and plants suitable for cul- 
tivation.''^ 

Because of its statements, and the deduc- 
tions which may be made from it, this book 
may now be considered as a valuable docu- 
ment. It is a painstaking work, being a very 
remarkable technical inventory of all the 
economic resources of Asia Minor. It is il- 
lustrated by photographs, the dates on which 
show that the indispensable researches on the 
spot were made in 1893. This is proved by 
the facsimile here given of a photograph (fac- 
ing p. 154), and also by the allusions to the 
title-page to be found in the body of the book. 
Now, this work is due to the collaboration 
of five German officers then in active service : 

Karl Kannenberg, first lieutenant in the 
19th regiment of field artillery; Captains 
Anton of the 17th regiment, also of the light 
artillery, Von Prittwitz and Gaffron of the 
93rd regiment of infantry, and First Lieutenant 
Schaffer of the Great General Staff. 

We learn from a note on the fourth page of 
the introduction that the last-named officer 
went all through Anatolia for the express pur- 
pose of making topographical reports. 



154 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

It is quite clear that this book embodies part 
of the results of an investigation with which 
William II. had charged five of his officers. 
It was certainly not by accident nor for their 
own amusement that five German officers in 
active service were able to make a long and 
costly stay in Asiatic Turkey, with all the 
necessary means for carrying on a very arduous 
investigation. It is, therefore, incontestable 
that as far back as 1893, twenty-one years 
before the war, the German Government sent 
its officers to study Turkey, not only from a 
military point of view, but also especially from 
the standpoint of economics, in order to ascer- 
tain the resources in the Ottoman Empire on 
which Germany might draw, either during 
peace or in the event of war. Thanks to this 
precise information, which certainly has not 
been lost sight of since 1893, Germany has 
been able to undertake the rapid development 
of Anatolia, a task which she has pursued with 
great zeal for the past two years, and which 
has had an important influence on the evolu- 
tion of the war. 

The German Government in 1893 was that 
which felt the first forward pressure exercised 
by William II., who had begun to reign in 
1888. We may be sure that if in 1893 it was 




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CONCLUSIONS 155 

thought necessary to send five German officers 
to search out Asiatic Turkey from an economic 
point of view, it was because the Kaiser him- 
seK (and this was proved by his later actions) 
had made up his mind to find out exactly what 
Germany might or might not expect to find 
in the East. Finally, we must notice care- 
fully that prior to 1893 neither the Panger- 
man plan nor any movement in that direction 
was known. The formula of "from Hamburg 
to the Persian GuK" was as yet unheard of. 
It is possible to prove, with the help of dates 
and indisputable facts, that the preparations 
for the Hamburg-Bagdad railway were the 
Kaiser's personal work. Indeed, as soon as 
investigations like that undertaken by the 
five officers mentioned above had convinced 
the Kaiser that he could lay his hands on 
enormous booty by swindling Turkey, he de- 
voted himself to the task energetically, having 
first paved the way by appearing to yield to 
popular opinion. It was in 1894 that the Pan- 
german movement began to take shape, and 
its development would have been impossible in 
a country so entirely under police rule as Ger- 
many unless it had had the secret support of 
official authority. It was in 1898 that WilHam 
II. went to Damascus, and there assured the 



156 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

Moslems, in a famous toast, of his undying 
friendship. From Damascus he proceeded to 
Constantinople, and there he flattered Abdul 
Hamid, the Red Sultan (then under a cloud 
on account of the Armenian massacres), so 
successfully that on November 27th, 1899, the 
Deutsche Bank of Berlin obtained the neces- 
sary concession for the railway to Bagdad. 
As soon as the news of this concession or 
firman reached William II., his delight over 
the success of the first step toward the realiza- 
tion of his marvellous dream was so great that 
it found expression in an ardent telegram to 
Abdul Hamid. 

When he was at Windsor, in 1907, the 
Kaiser tried in vain to remove England's ob- 
jections to the Bagdad railway, but in No- 
vember, 1910, during the Czar's visit to 
Potsdam, he succeeded in getting the better 
completely of Nicholas II. Suddenly, on 
August 10th, 1913, all the Kaiser's prepara- 
tions were hindered by the peace of Bucharest, 
and he made up his mind at once to bring on 
war. As far back as November 6th, 1913, he 
told King Albert of Belgium at Potsdam that 
"war was near and inevitable." In April, 
1914, the Kaiser, accompanied by Admiral 
von Tirpitz, paid a visit to the Archduke 



CONCLUSIONS 157 

Francis-Ferdinand at Konopischt. Now, it 
was also in April, 1914, according to the state- 
ment of M. Radoslavoff himself, that the Kaiser 
concluded the treaties with Sofia and Constan- 
tinople which assured him the military co-opera- 
tion of Bulgaria and Turkey in the war which 
he meant to bring on within a short time."^ 

From this long series of undeniable facts 
the responsibility of Germany stands out even 
more clearly than if we only try to prove it 
from the diplomatic papers which were ex- 
changed in the days just before hostilities be- 
gan. We may therefore state as did Count 
Karolyi, one of Germany's allies, that "Ger- 
many is fighting for the road from Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf." During twenty -one years 
Germany prepared all the means necessary to at- 
tain this result; therefore, her responsibility is 
crushing and inexcusable. 

The people of Germany accepted this war 
enthusiastically, because Pangerman propa- 
gandists had convinced them beforehand that 
it would bring them enormous profits. Maxi- 
milian Harden acknowledged this outright in 
August, 1914, writing in his review, Zuhunft, 
at a time when German victory seemed cer- 

* Havas despatch, in the Petit Parisien, March 26th, 1916; Le 
Temps, April 10th, 1916. 



158 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 



tain: "Why should we make paltry excuses? 
Yes, we brought on the war, and we are glad 
of it. We provoked it because we were sure 
of winning." 



Hamburg 




"FROM HAMBURG TO THE PERSIAN GULF 
THE NET IS SPREAD." 

PBESIDENT WILSOW'S FUG DAY ADDRESS, JUNE 15, tWT. 



To-day the facts are before us. In his Flag 
Day speech, on June 15th, 1917, President 
Wilson made the German premeditation and 
aims admirably clear. "The demands made 
by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single 



CONCLUSIONS 159 

step in a plan which compassed Europe and 
Asia, from Berhn to Bagdad. ..." The 
object of Berhn "contemplated binding to- 
gether racial and political units which could 
be held together only by force, Czechs, Mag- 
yars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Ar- 
menians. . . . These peoples did not wish to 
be united. They ardently desired to direct 
their own affairs. . . . And they [the Ger- 
man military statesmen] have actually carried 
the greater part of that amazing plan into exe- 
cution ! . . . Austria is at their mercy. . . . 
The so-called Central Powers are in fact but 
a Single Power. . . . From Hamburg to the 
Persian Gulf the net is spread." 

The map given on p. 158 explains this re- 
ality, and German responsibility is once more 
made clear, this time by geography. 

II. 

The Allies should constantly hear in mind 
not only the German occupations of Entente 
territory y but also the Pangerman seizures which 
have been made at the expense of their own 
allies. 

In point of fact these seizures are still more 
serious than the German occupations in the 



160 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 



east and in the west, since, in combination 
with the occupation of Serbia, they make Ger- 
many mistress of Central Pangermany, and 
thus give BerHn an opportunity to follow out 



TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY PANGERMANY 
AT THE OPENING OF 1917 



Petrograd 




all the rest of the Pangerman plan in a very 
short time. The truth of this statement may 
be proved by reference to the accompanying 
map or diagram, which shows the total Pan- 
german occupations in the beginning of 1917. 
The Germans themselves attach more im- 
portance to their seizures in the southeast at 



CONCLUSIONS 161 

the expense of their own aUies than they do 
to their occupations in the east and west. 

The German review which, considering its 
character, is so ironically named Peace, had 
in its number of February 1st, 1917, the fol- 
lowing avowal: "In two years of war, Germany 
has cut for herself, out of an exhausted Europe, 
an Empire which reaches from the North Sea 
to the Persian Gulf^^ [sic]. "Should the war go 
on, who dare say that this Empire may not be 
still further extended by the addition of Greece, 
Egypt, Holland, and Scandinavia?"* 

Doctor Friedrich Naumann, whose propa- 
ganda did much toward the creation of Mittel- 
europa, is a member of the democratic group 
in the Reichstag. On July 10th, 1917, he voted 
for the famous formula "Peace without an- 
nexations or indemnities," because he well 
knew, for reasons which I have given in my 
sixth chapter, that it would allow the Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf plan to go on unhindered. 
In his pamphlet, Bulgaria and Middle-Europe, "f 
Naumann gave away the secret of the Panger- 
manizing of Europe by saying: '' Whatever is 
distinctly national in character, or of a military 
order, shall be decentralized.'' Which means in 

* Le Matin, February 28th, 1917. 

t Published in 1916, by Reimer, Berlin. 



162 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

plain language that the old names and frontiers 
of States would be left unchanged for the 
present, in order to throw dust in the eyes of 
the world for a short time, but that all the 
military forces from Hamburg to the Persian 
Gulf would be centralized under the leader- 
ship of Berlin. 

It is this military association of at least 150 
millions of men, brought under the orders of 
Prussian militarism, which makes the very 
great peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan 
— a peril which sums up all the others rep- 
resenting the outcome of Prussian ambition. 
That is why President Wilson so justly said 
in his message to Russia: '' The' day has come 
to conquer or submit. ^^ 

ni. 

The Allies should so conduct the war that Pan- 
germany shall not only he destroyed, hut replaced 
by territorial conditions which will prevent its 
recurrence, and which conform to the principles 
which the Allies have proclaimed. 

In their answer of January 10th, 1917, to 
President Wilson the Allies affirmed: "The civ- 
ilized world knows that [the objects of the war] 
imply, in all necessity and in the first instance, 



CONCLUSIONS 163 

the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of 
Montenegro, and the indemnities which are 
due them; the evacuation of the invaded terri- 
tories of France, of Russia and of Roumania, 
with just reparation; the reorganization of 
Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and 
founded as much upon respect of nationalities 
and full security and liberty of economic de- 
velopment, which all nations, great or small, 
possess, as upon territorial conventions and 
international agreements, suitable to guarantee 
territorial and maritime frontiers against un- 
justified attacks; the restitution of provinces 
or territories wrested in the past from the 
Allies by force or against the will of their 
populations; the liberation of Italians, of 
Slavs, of Roumanians and of Tcheco -Slovaks 
from foreign domination; the enfranchisement 
of populations subject to the bloody tyranny 
of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of 
the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to West- 
ern civilization." 

In his message to the Senate on January 
22nd, 1917, President Wilson said: *'No peace 
can last, or ought to last, which does not recog- 
nize and accept the principle that governments 
derive all their just powers from the consent 
of the governed, and that no right anywhere 



164 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty 
to sovereignty as if they were property. 

"I take it for granted, for instance, if I may 
venture upon a single example, that statesmen 
everywhere are agreed that there should be a 
united, independent and autonomous Poland 
and that henceforth inviolable security of life, 
of worship and of industrial and social develop- 
ment should be guaranteed to all peoples who 
have lived hitherto under the power of govern- 
ments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile 
to their own. ... I am proposing . . . that 
no nation should seek to extend its policy oveir 
any other nation or people, but that every 
people should be left free to determine its own 
policy, its own way of development, unhin- 
dered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along 
with the great and powerful." 

In his message to Russia on June 9th, 1917, 
President Wilson stated that: "Government 
after Government has by their [the German 
rulers'] influence, without open conquest of its 
territory, been linked together in a net of in- 
trigue directed against nothing less than the 
peace and liberty of the world. The meshes 
of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot 
be broken unless wrongs already done are un- 
done; and adequate measures must be taken 



CONCLUSIONS 



165 




166 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

to prevent it from ever again being rewoven 
or repaired. 

"Of course, the Imperial German Govern- 
ment and those whom it is using for their own 
undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the 
war will end in the restoration of the status quo 
ante out of which this iniquitous war issued 
forth, the power of the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment within the empire and its wide-spread 
domination and influence outside of that em- 
pire. That status must be altered in such 
fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing 
from ever happening again." 

These quotations enable us to see that the 
views of the European Allies and those of 
President Wilson are identical in regard to 
the remaking of Europe. It is by starting 
from the principle of nationalities, and by 
making allowances for the natural contin- 
gencies which are inevitable from its applica- 
tion, that we may sketch a map (see map on 
p. 165) which will conform to the principles 
laid down by the Allies. 

This map does not pretend to give any de- 
tailed solution as to the reconstruction of Eu- 
rope when peace shall have been made, nor 
to solve the various problems to which the 
constitution of each State may give rise. The 



CONCLUSIONS 167 

object of this plan is only to show frankly that 
the war objectives of the Allies, and the prop- 
ositions of President Wilson in regard to a 
just and lasting peace, arrive at the same gen- 
eral conclusion, based on geography. Besides, 
these conclusions are the only means by which 
the power of Prussian militarism can be laid 
low. As a matter of fact, while adhering 
strictly to the modern principles of justice, 
they deprive Germany of the regions which 
are useful to her for strategic offensives, and 
by the creation of a belt of independent States 
to the south of her they will take away the 
man power which alone allows her to continue 
the war. This is shown by the following state- 
ments. 

After having conformed to the principles of 
President Wilson by giving back the territory 
of Poland, with its six millions of inhabitants, 
the Danish territory (including the portions 
necessary to make that source of aggression, 
the Kiel Canal to the Elbe, international 
property), which would mean about 500,000 
inhabitants, and the provinces of Alsace and 
Lorraine, which number about 1,500,000 in- 
habitants, Germany would find her population 
reduced from 68 million before the war to 
about 60 million more or less. 



168 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

President Wilson's formula that: "Inviola- 
ble security of life, of worship and of industrial 
and social development should be guaranteed 
to all peoples who have lived hitherto under 
the power of governments devoted to a faith 
and purpose hostile to their own," means the 
condemnation of the Empire of the Haps- 
burgs, which is a mosaic of peoples held to- 
gether in the same State against their will. 

Application of the same principle of na- 
tionality to Austria-Hungary would scatter 
five out of her 12 millions of Germans; one 
into Roumania, three into the Czech-Slovak 
State, one into the Magyar State. That would 
leave only seven millions of Germans, which 
would reduce Austria to its normal limits. 
We must take into account that this number 
contains in reality nearly a million of Czechs, 
who are wrongly classed as Germans in Vien- 
nese statistics. Now, would these seven mil- 
lions of Germans contained in the restricted 
Austria wish to join themselves to the Ger- 
mans of Germany .f^ Nothing is less certain, 
if they still remember the suffering inflicted 
on them under the hegemony of Berlin, and 
above all if Austria's economic outlet to the 
sea is to be assured toward the south. 

But let us suppose that these seven millions 



CONCLUSIONS 169 

of Austro-Germans, invoking the principle of 
nationalities, do wish to join the 60 million 
Germans of Germany. That would make 
67 millions of Germans, or one milHon less 
than before the war. It is, therefore, not cor- 
rect to say that to divide Austria-Hungary would 
be to increase the numerical strength of Ger- 
many. Besides, the seven millions of Austro- 
Germans would be reunited to a Germany 
which, thanks to the application of the principle 
of nationalities, had lost all the regions which 
were valuable to her for strategic offensives; Polish 
territory, the Emperor William Military Canal, 
and Alsace-Lorraine — all of them regions with- 
out which the present German offensive would 
have been impossible. 



But I insist that in order to obtain this re- 
sult, which undoubtedly in its general lines 
follows the declarations of the Allies, the liqui- 
dation of Austria-Hungary, the vassal of Berlin, 
is absolutely indispensable. I have studied the 
problem of Central Europe from all points of 
view for more than twenty years, and I affirm 
that victory for the Allies is impossible without 
a complete reconstruction of the centre of Europe 
on a democratic basis. An independent Poland, 



170 UNITED STATES AND PANGERMANIA 

and also a Czech State, a free Yugo-Slavia, and a 
democratic Magyar State, are the essential and 
unavoidable conditions necessary for the destruc- 
tion of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, and 
the creation of a first ethnographic barrier strong 
enough to prevent any counter-attack on the part 
of Pangermanism. 

Unless these barrier States are formed, there 
can be no lasting restitution of Alsace-Lorraine 
to France, Russia becomes the prey of Germany, 
the forces of Prussian militarism are strength- 
ened tenfold, the whole of Europe is reduced to 
slavery; and, as a consequence, the freedom of 
the United States is now actually and directly 
threatened. 



